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Abstract 
Current evidence on the predictability of technical analysis largely concentrates on 
price-based technical indicators such as moving averages rules and trading range 
breakout rules. In contrast, the predictability of widely used technical market 
indicators such as advance/decline lines, volatility indices, and short-term trading 
indices has drawn limited attention. Although some market indicators have also 
become popular sentiment proxies in the behavioral finance field to predict returns, 
the results generally rely on using just one or a few indicators at a time. This approach 
raises the risk of data snooping, since so many proxies are proposed. We review and 
examine the profitability of a wide range of 93 market indicators. We give these 
technical market indicators the benefit of the doubt, but even then we find little 
evidence that they predict stock market returns. This conclusion continuously holds 
even if we allow predictability to be state dependent on business cycles or sentiment 
regimes. 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
Technical analysis, a methodology for forecasting the direction of security prices 
through the study of past market data, is widely used by practitioners. A survey on 
692 fund managers shows that 87% of the fund managers place some importance on 
technical analysis when making their investment decisions (Menkhoff, 2010). 
However, there has been controversy over whether technical analysis actually helps to 
predict the markets. Some previous studies (e.g., Brock, Lakonishok, & LeBaron, 
1992; Fama & Blume, 1996; Jensen & Bennington, 1970) try to examine the 
predictability of classic price-based technical indicators. However, these studies 
cannot provide affirmative evidence of the usefulness of technical analysis because 
the conclusions are mixed. In a review study, Irwin and Park (2007) find that 56 out 
of 95 modern studies on technical analysis produce supportive evidence of its 
profitability. 
However, some academics consider that much of the positive evidence is 
pseudoscience or dubious (Paulos, 2003) because of problems such as data snooping 
and sample bias. More importantly, most studies only consider price-based technical 
indicators that are just a subset of all technical indicators. There are other types of 
technical indicators—so called technical market indicators—that investors and media 
and finance professionals use frequently as well, such as advance/decline lines, the 
Arms Index, and volatility indices. Contrary to price-based indicators that use only 
historical prices information to predict future price movements of individual stocks or 
the aggregate market, market indicators use a variety of other financial market 
information, such as trading volumes, investor sentiment survey results, and implied 
market volatility, to predict the aggregate market. 
Market indicators are very important to practitioners. A popular technical analysis 
book, Achelis (2001, p. 38), states, “Market indicators add significant depth to 
technical analysis, because they contain much more information than price and 
volume … the analogy being ‘all boats rise in a rising tide’.” Many major data 
vendors, such as MarketWatch and Bloomberg, report these indicators regularly as 
key market statistics. For example, MarketWatch, among many other data vendors, 
presents analysis on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index 
nearly every day. In contrast to the popularity and acceptance these technical market 
indicators have received from practitioners, however, limited academic scrutiny has 
been presented on the predictability of these market indicators. Our study tries to fill 
the gap in the literature by examining the predictability of a wide range of market 
indicators. We look at all 93 market indicators from the Global Financial Data 
database,
1
 which, to our best knowledge, is one of the most comprehensive ranges of 
market indicators. 
                                                          
1
 See www.globalfinancialdata.com. We exclude a few indicators from the Global Financial Database, 
including New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) money borrowed and NYSE debit balances, since the 
data end in 1967 and 1970, respectively. We exclude most CBOE volatility indices except that for the 
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Branch (1976), which comes closest to our work, reviews the predictability of a range 
of 10 market indicators and documents mixed results. The author points out that the 
study is limited by insufficient data access, even many more indicators are proposed. 
Nearly 40 years later, with access to a much broader set of market indicators, 
including those introduced during those 40 years, we can now conduct a 
comprehensive study on market indicators. Using a wide range of 93 market 
indicators, however, we find no evidence that they show predictability for future stock 
returns. This conclusion consistently holds even if we allow predictability to be state 
dependent on business cycles or sentiment regimes. 
Our range of indicators covers nearly all those available in the Global Financial Data 
database except a few that do not have sufficient data. In addition, we add common 
transformations of the raw indicators provided by Global Financial Data. The idea is 
that the raw data may contain both signal and noise and the technical transformations 
might reduce the noise in those series. However, we find no significant predictability 
either from the raw data or from the popular technical transformations. Moreover, we 
use the longest sample for each indicator available from the database to best avoid the 
data-snooping problems pointed out by many previous studies (e.g., Lakonishok & 
Smidt, 1988). The longest sample in our study is nearly 200 years and the overall 
average sample length is 54 years. 
Accounting for the data-snooping bias is particularly important in the field of 
technical analysis. In particular, the predictability of technical analysis can change 
over time. Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992) find that price-based technical 
trading strategies beat the market in their 90-year sample from 1897 to 1986. Fang, 
Jacobsen, and Qin (2013), however, find that the predictability disappears completely 
on a fresh 25-year sample from 1987 to 2012. Hence, using the longest sample 
available best prevents such data-driven results. On the other hand, predictability also 
varies greatly across different market indicators. Hence, using the widest range of 
market indicators we can obtain also safeguards our results against data-snooping 
issues. 
Our preliminary analysis shows that at a conservative 10% significance level, 30 out 
of 93 indicators show possible predictability. However, only 10 of these remain 
significant after we conduct sub-sample robustness checks.
2
 Since some indicators 
exhibit sign-switching predictability in the sub-sample test, we employ rolling 
window regressions to take a closer look at the stability of indication. This further 
reduces the number of possible predictive indicators to eight. We then conduct 
economic significance tests to account for risk and transaction costs and none of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500, since their sample periods are shorter than 10 years, most not actually 
starting until 2011. For similar reasons, we do not include the S&P total dividend declarations, the S&P 
monthly dividend declarations, the S&P 500 monthly advancing/declining stocks, or the S&P 500 
index sales per share. 
2
 These 10 market indicators are the NYSE short sales volumes–members/specialist/total, the NYSE 
short interest ratio, the NYSE advances/declines/new highs, the Alternext declines/new highs, and 
weekly NYSE cumulative highs. 
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technical trading strategies beats the naïve buy and hold strategy in terms of either the 
Sharpe ratio or Jensen’s α. 
We make no conclusions on the predictability of market indicators yet. A recent 
strand in the literature documents that some return-predicting models are time varying 
and state dependent (Dangl & Halling, 2009; Henkel, Martin, & Nardari, 2010; 
Jacobsen, Marshall, & Visaltanachoti, 2010; Yu & Yuan, 2011). For example, 
Jacobsen, Marshall, and Visaltanachoti (2010) show that an increasing industrial 
metal index can significantly predict higher stock market returns during contractions 
but lower market returns during expansions. These two effects offset each other. As a 
result, the industrial metal index does not show any predictability if not contingent on 
states of the economy. The underlying reason for the time variation of return 
predictability is that the same news may be interpreted differently by investors across 
business cycles (Boyd, Hu, & Jagannathan, 2005; Jacobsen, Marshall, & 
Visaltanachoti, 2010; McQueen & Roley, 1993).  
In the case of technical analysis, the same information can also be interpreted 
differently across different states of the economy. For instance, a rising value of 
investors’ bearish sentiment index during contractions often indicates a bearish 
sentiment extreme that signals a potential market reversal. In contrast, a rising value 
of bearish sentiment during market expansions can signal investors’ fear about the 
future market and thus a decreased market. If that is the case, the observed non-
predictability of the market indicators could be due to their time variation or state 
dependency. This conjecture has been recognized by practitioners
3
 and supported by 
the empirical findings on price-based indicators of Han, Yang, and Zhou (2013), who 
show that moving average strategies generate much higher abnormal returns in 
recessions. We hence explicitly test if there is any time variation or state dependency 
that could also shadow the real predictability of market indicators by using the 
regime-switching methodology of Jacobsen, Marshall, and Visaltanachoti (2010).  
We define our business cycles by using National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) data. Our results show that 26 (21) market indicators show possible 
predictability in expansion (contraction) periods in the first place and the numbers are 
both smaller than the 30 we find in the full sample. Further F-test results testing the 
statistical difference in predictability between expansion and contraction periods 
reveal that only 19 indicators show significantly different predictability in one of the 
business states over the others. That is, most indicators (74 out of 93) do not seem to 
suffer from the problem where they potentially exhibit predictability in one of the 
business states but this predictability is shadowed by insignificant predictability in the 
other business state in the full-sample test. Nevertheless, we continue our economic 
significance test for those possible 26 (21) predictors under expansions (contractions) 
separately. During expansion periods, we find one market indicator has a higher 
                                                          
3
 Edwards, Magee, and Bassetti (2007, p. 17) point out, “One of the keys in long-term chart analysis is 
realizing that market behaves differently in different economic cycle. … Identifying where you are in 
an economic cycle … is critical to interpreting the chart patterns evolving at that time.” 
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Sharpe ratio than the buy and hold strategy and another market indicator has a 
significant positive Jensen’s α.4 During contraction periods, none of the 93 indicators 
show any economic value. Although it remains possible the two indicators have some 
predictive value in expansion periods only, our overall results generally do not seem 
to suggest the business cycle-dependent predictability of the market indicators. 
Besides testing the possible time-varying predictability on business cycles that many 
return predictability studies have considered, we also look at the sentiment cycles 
recently introduced by Yu and Yuan (2011). They find that the mean–variance 
tradeoff differs across high- and low-sentiment periods. The intuition for the 
differences between high- and low-sentiment periods on returns is as follows. During 
a high-sentiment period, when more irrational investors participate, the price deviates 
more from its fundamental value, whereas during a low-sentiment period, the price 
more accurately reflects its fundamentals, with less sentimental noise. We thus are 
motivated to test if technical market indicators’ predictability can differ across 
sentiment cycles, considering a fundamental belief of technical analysis that the price 
has already reflected all information and investors’ aggregate sentiment is the main 
driver of price deviation from its fundamental value (Kirkpatrick & Dahlquist, 2010). 
The test results on sentiment cycles remain largely similar to those on business cycles: 
21 (25) indicators show possible predictability in high-sentiment (low-sentiment) 
periods, while only 10 of them show significantly different predictability across these 
two regimes. Moreover, after we consider economic significance, none of the market 
indicators remain predictive. These findings further eliminate the possibility of the 
state-dependent predictability of the market indicators. 
We try to give our market indicators the benefit of the doubt as much as possible. In 
that sense, our linear regression tests with a general correction for heteroscedasticity 
may be too restrictive. Therefore, as a robustness check, we verify whether these 
technical market indicators might work if we reduce noise in the data. We model the 
heteroscedasticity more explicitly using a GARCH(1,1) model. We follow the same 
steps above as those under ordinary least squares (OLS) and find consistent results of 
no predictability. We also check if outliers could affect our results by using robust 
regressions, particularly because we observe problems such as widening confidence 
bounds under the OLS rolling window regressions. Only one indicator may possess 
predictive value when the effect of extreme observations is controlled for. Moreover, 
we use the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) data alternatively to define 
business cycles; we also check the possible impact of the recent 2008 financial crisis 
by omitting this period from our sample; lastly, we also replicate our analysis 
excluding the top and bottom 5% extreme observations. Our finding of weak 
predictability remains similar. 
                                                          
4
 The indicator U.S. mutual fund equity fund redemptions has a higher Sharpe ratio than the buy and 
hold strategy and the NYSE new highs indicator has a significantly positive Jensen’s α. 
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Can we rely on technical analysis? Our results, from evaluating a comprehensive 
range of technical market indicators using the longest sample available, do not seem 
to suggest an affirmative answer to this question. Our main contribution lays in filling 
the gap in the literature on a comprehensive study of the technical market indicators 
by providing strong statistical and economic evidence on their practical usage. Our 
study has particularly important implications for practitioners who rely heavily on 
technical analysis in making investment decisions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. To best serve the overview role of this 
paper, Section 2 first explicitly reviews current evidence on our market indicators 
before a formal analysis, including those from the sentiment field. This provides an 
overall understanding and expectation of the predictability of the market indicators. 
We then introduce our data and methodology in Section 3, followed by a presentation 
of the empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 explicitly examines the time-varying 
predictability of the market indicators and Section 6 provides various robustness 
checks. We conclude the paper in Section 7. 
 
2. Technical Market Indicators 
Fundamentally, technical analysis believes that stock prices follow trends because 
investors collectively repeat their patterned trading behavior, which is the major 
driver of stock price fluctuations (Murphy, 1999). Although the patterned behavior 
may be irrational, by exploring the pattern—the trend—one can effectively anticipate 
future price movements. 
Market indicators can be classified into two groups: market sentiment indicators and 
market strength indicators. The market sentiment indicators predict market 
movements based on tracking the bullish or bearish psychology of the market. When 
bullish (bearish) sentiment dominates the market, stock prices will rise (decline), 
associated with an increasing demand for (supply of) securities. Market strength 
indicators measure the strength—the breadth—of market movements. A strong 
movement with a high breadth reading will last longer and take the market to higher 
highs or lower lows. Market indicators expand the information set of technicians 
beyond classic price and volume data to a variety of financial information. Although 
market indicators are sometimes used in other markets, such as the futures market, 
they primarily analyze aggregate stock market movements (Achelis, 2001, p. 31). 
While evaluating overall market conditions remains important even when investing in 
individual stocks, the measurements of individual stocks’ sentiment or the strength of 
price movements are generally noisy and less reliable with limited data access. 
Among the 93 market indicators our paper studies, 65 are raw indicators that extract 
information from market data directly, such as total market advance/decline issues in 
a trading day, and the other 28 are transformed indicators that manipulate raw 
information through some formula. For example, net advances equal raw decline 
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issues deducted from raw advance issues. This has a benefit for the practitioner. One 
may favor a few particular transformed indicators when one believes that the 
transformation can provide further indications over what the raw information can. For 
instance, in the above example, net advances indicate the strength of a trend on a 
relative basis, comparing the up and down trend strengths, while the raw 
advances/declines focus solely on the up/down trend. While many previous studies 
use transformed indicators only—for example, on advance/decline information, 
Brown and Cliff (2004) use the advance/decline ratio and Zakon and Pennypacker 
(1968) use the advance/decline line—our study may shed light on whether using such 
a transformation has an advantage over using the raw information or whether it 
actually masks the raw information’s true predictability. 
Table 1 summarizes our indicators. Panels A and B report our reviews of market 
sentiment indicators and market strength indicators, respectively. We further classify 
our indicators into 14 sub-groups based on the type of information they use. As 
mentioned earlier, many indicators can use the same raw information. For example, 
our first group of sentiment indicators uses option volumes to proxy for aggregate 
sentiment, with a rising call (put) volume indicating investors’ bullish (bearish) 
sentiment since they are hedging against a potential market rise (fall). Global 
Financial Data provides the information from two sources, the CBOE and the OEX. 
The last indicator is a transformed indicator that uses the ratio of the traded value of 
put to call options to measure the relative strength of bearish sentiment to bullish 
sentiment. This gives us a total of five indicators for this group. In the remainder of 
the paper, we discuss our results by such a grouping. To save space, we review the 
underlying theory and existing evidence of our indicators explicitly in Table 1 and 
give a brief overview in the following. 
 
[Please insert Table 1 here.] 
 
2.1 Market Sentiment Indicators 
Sentiment is defined by Kirkpatrick and Dahlquist (2010, p. 90) as  
 
The net amount of any group of market players’ optimism or pessimism 
reflected in any asset or market price at a particular time. When a stock or 
commodity is trading at a price considerably above or below its intrinsic 
value, something we will not know until considerably later, the difference 
or deviation from that value often will be accounted for by sentiment. 
 
Following this definition, we have 50 sentiment indicators in total and we further 
categorize them into 11 sub-groups based on the type of raw information they use. 
Sentiment indicators can incorporate various information that past prices cannot 
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reveal. Some use direct sentiment poll results, such as the American Association of 
Individual Investors (AAII) and Investors Intelligence (II) sentiment indices, while 
others use data from the underlying derivative markets but not the stock market 
directly. For instance, we use put or call option volumes and volatility indices. In 
addition, a number of sentiment indicators use the statistics of different trading 
activities, such as odd-lot trading statistics, short sales statistics, mutual fund statistics, 
and margin account balances. Lastly, the rest of indicators include Barron’s 
confidence index, American Stock Exchange (AMEX) seat prices, and Moody’s or 
S&P 500’s aggregate number of positive/negative dividend news. 
 
Technical theories impose different signs on the way that the indicators predict the 
market, since they view different investors’ sentiment differently. A key issue is to 
distinguish between two major groups of market player sentiment: the uninformed 
and informed traders. Uninformed traders are passive and trade for liquidity (Wang, 
2002). De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1989, 1990a, 1990b) argue that 
uninformed traders tend to act strategically on noisy signals and therefore their trading 
can affect prices in a systematic way that deviates asset prices from fundamental 
values. According to Kirkpatrick and Dahlquist (2010), this group of investors largely 
consists of individual traders. They lack sufficient financial knowledge when making 
their investment decisions and their behavior is that of a crowd; in other words, they 
make decisions in line with everybody else, regardless of the true financial facts. Thus, 
the theory refers them as uninformed investors and views their decisions as always 
wrong, such that trading against them will result in significant gains. So-called 
contrarian indicators measure this group of investors’ sentiments. Examples of our 
contrarian indicators include odd-lot trading statistics, short sales of general public 
investors, and survey sentiment indices. In contrast, informed traders, who are 
sophisticated investors that have adequate financial knowledge, build their decisions 
on precise analysis of the market. Theory views their decisions as always true and 
accurate. Professional speculators, position traders, hedge fund managers, 
professional arbitrageurs, and insiders are considered to be in this category 
(Kirkpatrick & Dahlquist, 2010). Typical sentiment indicators for this group of 
investors include volatility indices, option trading volumes, and specialists’ short sales. 
These sentiment indicators have been receiving growing attention. In the academic 
fields, especially behavioral finance, many sentiment indicators used overlap with 
those we examine, those used by technical analysis. Since we have many indicators, 
we review the previous evidence by group in Table 1. In brief, the previous evidence 
is mixed, even when using the same sentiment proxies. For example, Seneca (1967) 
finds that the short interest ratio predicts monthly S&P 500 returns negatively from 
1946 to 1965. Brown and Cliff (2004), however, suggest that the short interest ratio 
does not predict S&P 500 returns from 1965 to 1998. This raises the concern of data 
snooping and calls for using a long sample period to safeguard against the data-
snooping issue and to update the results. Moreover, many studies in this field largely 
employ just one or a few indicators as sentiment proxies to predict the market, which 
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can also lead to the data-snooping problem, since so many indicators are proposed and 
some receive relatively more attention than others.
5
 Our wide range of indicators also 
avoids such risk. 
 
2.2 Market Strength Indicators 
While market sentiment indicators anticipate how investor behavior shifts market 
movements, market strength indicators measure the internal strength of these 
movements. The fundamental goal of technical analysis is to make a profit from 
tracking these movements, which requires accurate analysis of the timing of trends, 
addressing such questions as when does the market reach a bottom or a peak and can 
it reach lower lows or higher highs? Market strength indicators answer these questions 
by confirming the underlying trend when the trend is strong enough so that a rising or 
declining market may improve, even reaching higher highs or lower lows, or by 
disagreeing with the trend when the trend is weak and will deteriorate and, thus, 
becomes more likely to reverse. Market strength is measured based on whether the 
majority of individual stocks within the stock exchange participate in the uptrend or 
the downtrend. We have 43 strength indicators, which mainly use three kinds of 
information. 
1. Volume information. One of the earliest technical theories, the Dow theory, 
documented the importance of volume: “Bull markets terminate in a period of 
excessive activity and begin with comparatively light transactions” (Rhea, 1932). 
Indicators such as the NYSE total volume and total volume turnovers directly 
measure overall market trading activities. Moving one step further, the short-term 
trading indices use directional up/down volumes that track the trading volumes of 
advancing or declining issues separately. A strong trend is normally accompanied 
by an increasing volume in the same direction (Kirkpatrick & Dahlquist, 2010). 
 
2. The total number of advancing/declining stocks. A trend fueled by only a small 
number of stocks usually does not last long. One can use raw advance/decline 
information directly to measure market strength. Therefore we include such raw 
information for the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Alternext. Alternatively one can 
calculate the relative strength of the up/down trend through many different 
mathematical transformations. We include the three most common 
transformations: the net advances, the advance/decline line, and the percentage net 
advance for the three markets above. We formulate the transformation used in 
                                                          
5
 While some of the indicators in the database are discussed heavily in the literature, such as sentiment 
poll results and volatility indices, others receive much less attention. In particular, two groups of our 
indicators—exchange seat prices and the market aggregate number of dividend announcements—have 
not been studied in the previous literature to the best of our knowledge. While we find closely related 
studies that can help explain these indicators (as discussed in Table 1), we have not found their exact 
application by technical analysts on our best effort; however, we include these indicators in our study 
for completeness. 
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Table 1. Moreover, for the NYSE we have raw and transformed indicators data for 
both daily and weekly intervals. 
 
3. The total number of stocks that reach their periodic highs or lows. The underlying 
uptrend strengthens when more stocks advance to their periodic highs and vice 
versa. We also include the raw new highs/lows for the NYSE, NASDAQ, and 
Alternext and three common transformations of the raw information (net new 
highs, cumulative highs, and percentage net new highs). The data for the NYSE 
are again available at daily and weekly intervals. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample and Data 
We evaluate the technical indicators’ forecastability on the S&P 500, which proxies 
for the overall U.S. stock market. The returns are calculated as the log differences of 
current prices and prices from one period ahead. The S&P 500 contains the 500 most 
actively traded large-cap common stocks in the U.S. stock market. As one of the most 
historically extensive indices, the S&P 500 became available at daily, weekly and 
monthly frequencies in 1938, 1918, and 1791, respectively. 
We study the S&P 500 for several reasons. First, the long data series naturally shield 
against the potential data-snooping problem pointed out by Lakonishok and Smidt 
(1988) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990). Second, we have a wide range of technical 
indicators with sufficiently long data series designed specifically for the sophisticated 
U.S. market. The 500 stocks are listed on either the NYSE or the NASDAQ, the two 
largest American stock exchanges. This means that the S&P 500 index correlates 
highly with the NYSE and NASDAQ indices, which enables us to study technical 
indicators that contain information from both of these markets. Third, public investors 
hold the majority of the stocks in the U.S. market. Such heavy involvement of public 
investors satisfies the essential theoretical condition for many of the sentiment 
indicators, that uninformed investor sentiment becomes so influential that it can shift 
market movements. Last, the S&P 500 provides us with a sufficient number of stocks 
to ensure considerable market breadth when examining the market strength indicators. 
We obtain the return and indicator data from Global Financial Data.
6
 Our sample 
frequencies vary across the 93 indicators, with one annual indicator, 28 monthly 
indicators, 18 weekly indicators, and 46 daily indicators that anticipate different terms 
of market trends. We use the longest samples available for each of the indicators; the 
annual indicator starts in 1820 and the oldest monthly, weekly, and daily indicators 
                                                          
6
 See www.globalfinancialdata.com.  
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start in 1918, 1932, and 1938, respectively.
7
 Most of our sample periods end in 2010 
or 2011, subject to data availability. That is, the oldest market indicator (NYSE seat 
prices) has nearly 200 years of history and the 93 indicators have an average sample 
length of 54 years. 
As discussed in the previous section, we have several different indicator types: ratios 
(e.g., the NYSE short interest ratio), index numbers (e.g., the AAII bullish index), 
dollar units (e.g., AMEX seat prices), or simply unit numbers (such as option volumes, 
or the number of dividend news announcements). We report the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum values of their periodic changes in Appendix 1. 
In addition, to test the robustness of our results, we perform sub-sample analyses for 
each of our indicators. Since the sample periods vary greatly across indicators, we do 
not define universal sub-sample periods. Instead, we split each indicator’s full sample 
into two equal sub-samples. We also study state dependent predictability. We use two 
sources to define business cycles independently, following Jacobsen, Marshall, and 
Visaltanachoti (2010): NBER data
8
 and CFNAI
9
 data. The NBER business cycle data 
start in 1854, with a monthly frequency, and we classify a year as in expansion 
(contraction) if over seven months of the year are in expanding (contracting) periods. 
We define each week/day as expanding (contracting) if the month of the week/day 
falls within an expanding (contracting) month. The CFNAI data start in 1967. We 
classify a period as a contraction period when the CFNAI-MA3 is less than -0.7 and 
an expansion period when the CFNAI-MA3 is greater than -0.7. Unlike the NBER 
data, the CFNAI data are published in real time and are thus free of hindsight bias. 
We use these data to double-check our NBER results. 
For the sentiment regimes, we use Baker and Wurgler’s (2006)10 sentiment index, 
following Yu and Yuan (2011), to define high-/low-sentiment regimes. We classify a 
year as a high-sentiment (low-sentiment) year if the prior year has a positive (negative) 
value of the index. Baker and Wurgler (2006) calculate the index as the first principle 
component of six measures of investor sentiment, which are the closed-end fund 
discount, the NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, the average first-day return 
of IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium. The first principle 
calculation eliminates noise and captures the common component of the different 
sentiment measures. Furthermore, the authors first regress the six sentiment measures 
on a set of macroeconomic variables to remove business cycle information and then 
use the residuals as input for first principle component analysis. Therefore our 
sentiment time varying analysis does not overlap with the business cycle-varying 
analysis. 
                                                          
7
 The data on market sentiment indicators II bearish percentage and II bullish percentage are available 
from 1963, at the II website www.investorsintelligence.com. We use the longest sample period from 
Global Financial Data, which starts in 1987. 
8
 See http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
9
 See http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/cfnai/. 
10
 See http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/.  
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3.2 Methodology 
We run standard OLS regression to test the predictability of each of the 93 technical 
indicators: 
Rt = αt + βIt-1 + εt         (1) 
where 
 Rt represents the daily/weekly/monthly/annual log returns of the S&P 500 
index, 
 It-1 represents periodic percentage changes of the technical indicators from 
one period ahead, and 
 εt represents the residual term. 
The methodology simply tests whether periodic variations of the technical indicators 
anticipate the next period’s stock market returns. The parameter β captures the 
relation between market returns and the technical indicator. We use a conservative 10% 
significance level. 
We also run the following regression for state-dependent predictability, following 
Jacobsen, Marshall, and Visaltanachoti (2010): 
Rt = αt + β1Dt-1It-1 + β2 (1-Dt-1) It-1 + εt   (2) 
where 
 Rt represents the periodic return on the S&P 500 at time t, 
 It-1 represents the percentage change of the technical indicator one period 
ahead, 
 Dt-1 represents a dummy variable that equals one (zero) during expansions 
(contractions) for business cycle analysis and one (zero) during high-sentiment 
(low-sentiment) periods for sentiment cycle analysis, 
 and εt represents the residual term. 
The parameters β1 and β2 from equation (2) measure the predictability of the market 
indicators in expansion and contraction periods for business cycle analysis, 
respectively, or the predictability in high- and low-sentiment periods for sentiment 
cycle analysis, respectively. We further perform an F-test to test the statistical 
differences between β1 and β2. We use a conservative 10% significance level and 
apply White’s standard error corrections on all t-statistics and χ-statistics to counter 
heteroskedasticity issues. 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Main OLS Results 
Table 2 presents our main OLS results for the full sample in the first three columns, 
followed by the OLS results for two equal-fold sub-samples. For each sample, we 
report the sample periods, β estimates, and White standard error-corrected t-statistics. 
Panels A and B present the results for the market sentiment and market strength 
indicators, respectively. 
[Please insert Table 2 here.] 
The full-sample results show that 30 out of the total 93 market indicators predict the 
market at the 10% significance level. This includes 18 market sentiment indicators 
and 12 market strength indicators. In regard to the different underlying information, 
five groups of indicators (option volumes, Barron’s confidence index, exchange seat 
prices, total volumes, and total volume turnovers) exhibit no predictability at all. On 
the other hand, short sales volumes, volatility indices, and raw total market 
advance/decline indicators seem to perform better than the other indicators at first 
glance; all of them show (marginal) significance in predicting the market, except the 
NASDAQ 100 volatility index. 
Although 30 indicators show some preliminary predictability, we also need to 
consider an important and relevant question: Do they work in the way that technical 
theory expects? In other words, can one really make a profit from following the 
technical textbook? Our results provide a mixed answer to this question, with 10 of 
the 30 market indicators showing significant predictability, but with signs opposite 
from the expected. Eight sentiment indicators predict the market differently from what 
theory implies. Typical contrarian indicators such as the NYSE short interest ratio, the 
AAII bullish index, and U.S. mutual fund equity fund redemptions do not actually 
exhibit a contrarian nature. Instead, they capture the correct market direction. Hence, 
the traditional market wisdom that trading against uninformed investors no longer 
seems to hold here. In contrast, indicators on savvy investors, such as NYSE 
members/specialists, who are supposed to be correct, are also unreliable. For example, 
the increase in savvy short sales should predict a downward market. However, our 
results show that it is actually associated with a future market rise. Similarly, two 
market strength indicators, weekly NYSE advances and weekly NYSE cumulative 
highs, which should predict the market positively, actually have negative signs. Such 
results imply that, even though these market indicators show a significant relation 
with future returns, trading on them in the way indicated by theory will incur losses. 
In addition, the predictability of the same market strength information varies with the 
way it is used. First, the predictability depends on whether raw or transformed 
information is used. Interestingly, at both daily and weekly frequencies, all eight raw 
advance/decline indicators (marginally) predict the market, in contrast with none of 
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the transformed indicators. Hence, transformation of advance/decline information 
does not provide any further insight into market trends, it even appears to cause 
information loss. Furthermore, different underlying predictive horizons can incur 
variations in a particular indicator’s predictability. At daily frequencies, raw advances 
predict the market positively and raw declines predict the market negatively, which is 
in line with theory. However, such relations reverse at weekly frequencies. In addition, 
the new highs/new lows indicators work better in their raw forms at daily frequencies, 
whereas they only work in their transformed forms at weekly frequencies. 
The mixed full-sample results make it difficult to conclude yet whether the market 
indicators are useful or not, with 30 out of the 93 indictors showing some preliminary 
predictability, especially considering that they provide different indications than 
expected by the underlying theory and the predictability can differ with the method of 
using the information. We then further test the general stability of the indication by 
splitting the full samples into two sub-samples of equal length. Note that since the 
original full-sample lengths vary across indicators, the two sub-samples also have 
different lengths for different indicators. 
Our sub-sample results cast further doubt on the predictive power of the market 
indicators. Only 10 market indicators remain predictive in both of the sub-samples: 
three different types of investors’ short-sales volumes, the NYSE short interest ratio, 
daily NYSE advances and declines, daily Alternext declines, daily new highs of the 
NYSE and Alternext, and weekly NYSE cumulative highs. We highlight the 10 
predictive market indicators in boxes. If we further group these indicators by their 
underlying information, only some short sales statistics and market advances/declines 
or new highs/lows information may still contain some predictive value. 
The sub-sample results have several additional implications. First, Branch (1976) 
suggests that the predictability of technical indicators may disappear over time, since 
they will attract more investors to exploit their predictability after they are found to 
work. In this case, we should find more efficient technical indicators in the first sub-
sample. However, we discover similar numbers of efficient technical indicators in the 
first and second sub-samples, with only 10 indicators actually showing statistical 
significance in the latter half of the sample period. Nevertheless, most market 
indicators (52 out of 93) show no predictability in either sub-sample; it appears that 
these 52 indicators have never worked across their full history, which can be as long 
as 193 years (the sample of NYSE seat prices starts in 1820). It seems that the 
argument that predictability is gradually exploited over time does not hold. 
Second, one may argue that the development of financial markets enabled some 
trading methods that masked the true informational content of some historically useful 
technical indicators and led to the loss of their predictability. For example, 
Kirkpatrick and Dahlquist (2010) argue that margin debt, which was previously a very 
reliable indicator, is no longer an accurate gauge of investor sentiment because 
investors can, through using derivatives, hold positions outside the Federal Reserve 
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requirements for margins. Our results, however, do not appear to support such an 
argument, since margin debt does not work in the first sub-sample before 1963, when 
stock index derivatives were not as widely used by the public as they are now. We 
actually also find no predictability for the rest of the margin account statistics 
indicators. This further supports the view that predictability does not seem to decrease 
over time but, rather, probably to a large extent never existed. 
Of our 93 market indicators, only 10 survive the sub-sample analysis. It should be 
noted that the weekly NYSE cumulative highs predict the market differently in the 
two sub-sample periods, positively in the first sub-sample and negatively in the 
second. This raises an intriguing question: Even though the 10 market indicators are 
overall predictors of the market in the long run, do the indications they supply remain 
the same over time? How stable is the parameter β? We perform rolling window 
regressions to answer these questions. 
 
4.2 Rolling Window Regressions 
We run a 10-year
11
 rolling window regression on the 10 indicators that survive the 
sub-sample test. For each indicator, we first run the original OLS regression on the 
first 10 years of the sample and then move the sample one month forward by 
replacing the observations in the first month of the previous 10 years with those of the 
latest one month and repeat the OLS regression. Thus, the new regression window 
remains 10 years but rolls one month forward. We repeat this process until the last 
observation in the full sample is included in the last regression. The observed β should 
maintain at a relatively stable level if the indicator predicts the market consistently 
over time. 
[Please insert Figure 1 here.] 
Figure 1 plots the rolling OLS β values in solid lines and their 90% confidence 
bounds in dotted lines over time. On average, all three of the NYSE short sales–
members/specialists/total maintain reasonable consistency in predicting the market, 
except for the short period in 2001, when the market was closed because of the 911 
attack. Surprisingly, members’ and specialists’ short sales are persistently positively 
related to the market over time. That is, when the informed NYSE members, or the 
specialists, increase their short positions to hedge against a market fall, the market 
actually rises. Besides, we discover an intriguing pattern for the short interest ratio: 
The sign of β keeps switching between positive and negative over time. This casts 
                                                          
11
 One could argue that a regression window of 10 years is not adequate. For example, Jacobsen and 
Dannenburg (2003) suggest that, for monthly observations, 50 years of data are required to produce 
reliable GARCH estimates. However, in our case we use the longest sample available for each 
indicator and some of these indicators have a full history of only around 50 years (e.g., Alternext new 
highs). Our primary focus also lies in the stability of predictability across time and not the exact 
magnitude of the β value; a 10-year window for our rolling window regressions should serve such a 
goal. 
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strong doubts on its predictability, since it seems difficult to follow the varying 
indication it provides from time to time. In addition, the wide confidence bounds 
make it even harder to rely on such predictability. 
For the market strength indicators, the five raw indicators (NYSE 
advances/declines/new highs and Alternext declines/new highs) generally predict the 
market consistently over time, although at the same time, except for NYSE declines, 
the market indicators often experience periods with relatively wide confidence bounds 
for the β estimates. For example, NYSE advances have a wider confidence bound 
from late 1947 to late 1958 and from early 1987 to late 1997. The same is also the 
case for NYSE new highs after the 2008 financial crisis period. In contrast, the large 
fluctuation of β largely eliminates the NYSE weekly cumulative highs as reliable 
market predictors. The rolling window regression shows that for NYSE weekly 
cumulative highs, β is positive before 1974 (positive and close to zero from 1947 to 
1953), when it switches sign and remains negative and close to zero for the following 
10 years to 1984. Then its sign switches again to be positive until 1997, whereafter it 
becomes almost always negative. This probably explains why, in the sub-sample test, 
NYSE weekly cumulative highs predict the market differently in the two sub-samples. 
The rolling window regression results warn us about the danger of using short interest 
ratios and NYSE cumulative highs as market predictors, even though they all exhibit 
statistical significance in the full sample and sub-samples on first examination. This 
again emphasizes the importance of using a long sample period. The other eight 
indicators generally present relatively stable predictability, although to some degree 
they are exposed to the problem of wide confidence bounds. We perform several 
robustness checks to address this problem in Section 6 and the results remain largely 
the same. 
 
4.3 Economic Significance 
Our last step takes into account transaction costs and examines the risk-adjusted 
returns of investing on the eight indicators that provide relatively reliable indication 
over time. We use the methodology of Driesprong, Jacobsen, and Maat (2008) to test 
the economic significance of the market indicators. For each of the eight market 
indicators, we calculate our portfolio return by using OLS estimates, as follows: 
 We first split the sample into two equal lengths and we estimate the OLS 
model parameters αt and βt using the first half of our sample. 
 At time t + 1, we use αt, βt, and the last market indicator change It to calculate 
the expected return E(Rt+1). Then we compare E(Rt+1) with the same period’s 
risk-free rate     
 .
12
 We fully invest in the market if E(Rt+1) is higher than 
                                                          
12
 We source our risk-free rate data from Global Financial Data using three-month U.S. Treasury bill 
rates. 
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  , so that the portfolio return     
  =     
    and we fully invest in risk-free 
assets if E(Rt+1) is lower than     
            
  =     
 . 
 We re-estimate our model every period to update the model whenever a new 
observation becomes available and then calculate our portfolio returns.  
 Similarly to Driesprong, Jacobsen, and Maat (2008), we assume a switching 
cost of 0.10% between the market and risk-free assets, in accordance with 
Solnik (1993). 
We then compare the risk and return pattern of our portfolio with that of a naive buy 
and hold portfolio; we document the results in Table 2. We first report the mean, 
standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio for the buy and hold strategy and columns 7 to 9 
report those of the technical strategy. We calculate the Sharpe ratio as 
Sharpe ratio = (rt
p
 - rt
f )/σt
p 
where rt
p 
represents the returns of the technical trading strategies; rt
f 
represents the 
risk-free rate, which equals the U.S. three-month Treasury bill rates; and σp represents 
the standard deviation of rt
p
. The next column reports the t-values, testing the null 
hypothesis that the Sharpe ratio of the buy and hold strategy equals that of the 
technical strategy. The significance test is performed according to the methodology 
proposed by Lo (2002) and de Roon, Eiling, Gerard, and Hillion (2011), which 
assumes that the excess returns rt
p
 -
 
rt
f 
are independent and identically distributed 
normal. 
[Please insert Table 3 here.] 
The last four columns report the α and β estimates and their associated t-values for 
Jensen’s α estimation. We estimate Jensen’s α using the regression 
rt 
p
- rt
f = α + β (rt
m 
- rt
f 
) + εt 
where rt
p 
, rt
f
, and rt
m 
represent the returns of the technical trading strategies, risk-free 
rate, and market returns, respectively. The term α then captures the excess return on a 
given systematic risk level β of the technical trading strategy by using the buy and 
hold strategy as the benchmark. 
Compared with the buy and hold strategy, the technical strategies generally have both 
lower returns and lower risks. Three technical strategies (NYSE advances, declines, 
and new highs) even have negative returns, on average, before considering risks, 
which suggests investing on risk-free assets will be more mean–variance efficient. 
Furthermore, in terms of the Sharpe ratio that measures the price for each unit of risk, 
none of the technical strategies significantly outperforms the buy and hold strategy. In 
fact, most technical strategies have negative Sharpe ratios that underperform investing 
on risk-free assets. The results of Jensen’s α estimation provide more or less similar 
implications. Although all the β estimates are significantly below one, indicating 
lower risk levels, none of the technical trading strategies produce a more positive 
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excess return, captured by α, than the buy and hold strategy at this level of risk. 
Overall, our OLS results indicate none of the 93 market indicators generate returns 
outperforming the market. 
 
5. Time-Varying Predictability 
Our conclusion may be too restrictive yet if return predictability is state dependent. 
Prior literature has shown that some return predictability models’ effectiveness varies 
across business cycles (Dangl & Halling, 2009; Henkel, Martin, & Nardari, 2010; 
Jacobsen, Marshall, & Visaltanachoti, 2010) or across sentiment regimes (Stambaugh, 
Yu, & Yuan, 2011). Several of our market indicators exhibit sign-switching 
predictability across time, for example, the short interest ratio and weekly NYSE 
cumulative highs. If some of the technical market indicators have time-varying or 
state-dependent predictability, it remains possible that they have not been picked out 
by our full-sample and sub-sample tests. Hence, in this section, we implicitly 
investigate the time variation and state dependency of the 93 indicators. 
 
5.1 Business Cycle-Varying Predictability 
Han, Yang, and Zhou (2013) find that the moving average trading strategies generate 
much higher abnormal returns in recessions. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) discover 
similar evidence for momentum strategies, which generate positive returns only 
during expansions. On the other hand, Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) claim profitable 
momentum strategies in both good and bad economic states. All these studies provide 
evidence for business cycle-related predictability but do not pay attention to the 
market indicators. We seek to fill the gap here for the effect of market indicators on 
business cycle-varying predictability, if any. 
We use the monthly NBER business cycle data
13
 that start in 1854 to define expansion 
and contraction periods.
14
 We report the regression results in Table 4. The first two 
columns repeat our full-sample results again for comparison. Columns 3 to 6 report β1 
and β2, which measure the predictability of the market indicators in expansions and 
contractions, with White standard error-corrected t-statistics. The last column reports 
the F-test results, testing the statistical differences between β1 and β2. 
[Please insert Table 4 here.] 
 
                                                          
13
 See http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
14
 Our indicators have different frequencies and we define expansions and contractions as follows: The 
only annual indicator, NYSE seat prices, starts in 1820, whereas, due to data availability on business 
cycles, our time-varying evaluation on the annual indicator starts in 1854. We classify a year as in 
expansion (contraction) if over seven months of the year are in expanding (contracting) periods. We 
define each week/day as in expansion (contraction) if the month it falls in is expanding (contracting).  
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Generally, market indicators’ predictability does not seem to strengthen under 
different business states. We have 26 predictive indicators in expansions and 21 in 
contractions, suggesting overall market indicators do not seem to work better in one 
business state. In addition, compared with the 30 significant results discovered under 
the full sample, our results seem to suggest that predictability is not strengthened even 
if we allow it to be time varying across business cycles. The F-test results give a 
similar message, that the predictability of most market indicators (74 out of the total 
93) in contractions is not statistically different from that in expansions. This largely 
eliminates the possibility that these indicators work better in one business state and 
not the other, offsetting overall predictability. 
To allow the maximum benefit of the doubt, we perform economic significance tests 
for indicators that exhibit significant predictability in any of the expansion or 
contraction periods and we tabulate the results in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
Generally, the technical trading strategies have lower risk levels than the buy and hold 
strategies in both business states, although they largely do not beat the buy and hold 
strategies in returns for each unit of risk as measured by the Sharpe ratio. Jensen’s α 
results largely tell the same story: The technical trading strategies usually have low β 
levels, which means low systematic risk, but they do not generate excess returns to the 
market at the risk level β either. We have two exceptions in the expansion periods. 
Equity fund redemptions have a Sharpe ratio significantly higher than the market’s 
and a marginally significant Jensen’s α and NYSE net new highs have a significant 
positive Jensen’s α and a marginally significantly higher Sharpe ratio. These two 
indicators may show some predictability during expansion periods only; however, this 
finding does not alter our main conclusions. 
[Please insert Table 5&6 here.] 
 
5.2 Sentiment Regime-Varying Predictability 
We also test a second set of possible predictability regimes: the sentiment regimes 
introduced by Yu and Yuan (2011). These authors find a significantly positive mean–
variance relationship during low-sentiment periods but no relation during high-
sentiment periods in which sentiment shifts price away from its fundamental values. 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) also document that a set of asset pricing anomalies 
becomes stronger during high-sentiment periods. Their finding could have an impact 
on the predictability of market indicators. Many market indicators work on the basis 
of measuring investor sentiment, which technical analysis believes is the force that 
drives prices from their fundamental values (Kirkpatrick & Dahlquist, 2010). We 
therefore wonder whether these market indicators show stronger predictability during 
high-sentiment periods in which such forces become stronger. If this is the case, the 
full-sample analysis can miss such predictability. 
19 
 
Following Yu and Yuan (2011), we use the annual Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
sentiment index to define sentiment periods. Baker and Wurgler calculate a composite 
sentiment index as the first principle component of six measures of investor sentiment, 
namely, the closed-end fund discount, the NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, 
the average first-day return of IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the dividend 
premium. The first principle calculation eliminates noise and captures the common 
component of the different sentiment measures. Furthermore, the authors first regress 
the six sentiment measures on a set of macroeconomic variables to remove business 
cycle information and they then use the residuals as input for first principle 
component analysis. Therefore, our sentiment time-varying analysis does not overlap 
with the business cycle-varying analysis above. We then classify a year as a high-
sentiment year if the prior year has a positive Baker andWurgler (2006) index value. 
We use the same regime-switching methodology as above and define the dummy 
variable as equal to one (zero) during high-sentiment (low-sentiment) periods. 
We present the sentiment regime-varying results in Table 7.
15
 Again, we first recall 
the full-sample results in the first two columns and then subsequently present the 
results during high- and low-sentiment periods; lastly, we present the F-test results, 
testing the differences between high- and low-sentiment periods. 
[Please insert Table 7 here.] 
 
We find a total of 21 and 25 market indicators predicting the market during high- and 
low-sentiment periods, respectively. Contrary to what was expected, we do not 
discover more predictive indicators during high-sentiment periods, when sentiment 
becomes more important in driving prices. Instead, we even have a few more 
predictive indicators during the low-sentiment period. Moreover, both numbers of 
significant predictors are less than the 30 found under the full-sample periods. 
Moreover, the F-test results also show that, statistically, 83 out of the 93 indicators do 
not predict the market differently in two regimes. This finding contributes to the view 
that separate high- and low-sentiment regimes does not seem to increase the 
predictability of the market indicators. 
To further check if any of the single-state predictive indicators show true predictive 
value, we also perform similar economic significance tests as that above and 
document the results in Tables 8 and 9 for the two regimes. However, we find that 
none of the market indicators outperform the market in terms of the Sharpe ratio or 
                                                          
15
 Notice that the full-sample results are for the longest sample available for each of the indicators, 
while the sentiment regime varying results are for the period from 1967 to 2011 where the sentiment 
index is available. This may cause some unusual effect during comparison. For example, the NYSE 
Total Volume predicts returns in both regimes but not the full-sample. However this would not affect 
our main conclusion since we perform further analysis for the best benefit of doubt, also those 
indicators whose sample starts after 1967 would not suffer from this problem. 
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Jensen’s α. The results show that predictability does not strengthen under different 
sentiment regimes and our main conclusion in the full-sample remains robust. 
[Please insert Table 8&9 here.] 
 
6. Robustness Checks 
 
6.1 GARCH (1,1) Specifications 
In the previous OLS rolling window regression analysis, quite a few of our market 
indicators exhibit a widening of the confidence bounds problem. This may be a sign 
of volatility clustering. In fact, the volatility clustering problem in stock return data 
has been documented as early as 1963 Mandelbrot (1963). Many previous researchers 
argue a GARCH model can encounter such a problem. Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner 
(1993) survey this strand of studies in depth and also note that small numbers of 
GARCH parameters seem sufficient to model variance dynamics over very long 
sample periods. Although we use White standard errors to correct for the 
heteroskedasticity problem in the OLS results, a robustness check using a 
GARCH(1,1) model may provide further confidence in the results. The GARCH(1,1) 
model specifies the same linear relation between market returns and the change of 
market indicators, but assumes normally distributed standard errors whose variance is 
restricted as 
        Rt = α + βIt-1 + εt 
εt | ϕt-1 ~ N(0, σ²) 
 
  = α0 + α1    
  + α2    
 
 
We replicate our OLS analysis above by using the GARCH(1,1) model and present 
our results for the full sample and sub-samples in Table 10. In the full sample, we 
discover a total of 21 predictive market indicators at the 10% significance level, 
which is less than the 30 discovered in the OLS estimation. After the sub-sample 
analysis, 10 market indicators remain predictive; while most of them are the same as 
those found by the OLS regressions, the GARCH(1,1) model picks up NYSE free 
credit balances and S&P monthly extra dividends as market predictors, but drops the 
short interest ratio and NYSE cumulative highs featured in the OLS results. We then 
test the economic significance of the 10 indicators using the GARCH (1,1) estimates 
and we present the results in Table 11. None of the market indicators beats the market 
under GARCH(1,1) model either. 
[Please insert Table 10&11 here.] 
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6.2 Robust Regressions 
Outliers can be another issue that causes instability of indication. We replicate our 
analysis using robust regressions to control the effect of potential outliers. Robust 
regressions limit the influence of outliers through estimating a scale parameter that 
downweights the observations that have large residuals. Robust regressions mainly 
control outliers on the dependent variable side. We follow the M-estimation method 
introduced by Huber (1973) to obtain our β estimates and we report the results in 
Table 12. 
[Please insert Table 12 here.] 
 
We have 32 indicators predict the full-sample returns, compared to the 30 under the 
OLS. The sub-sample analysis also gives us 10 indicators that provide relatively 
stable indication over time. Nine of these indicators are same as those under the OLS 
sub-sample analysis, while the robust regressions drop NYSE weekly cumulative 
highs but add the CBOE S&P 500 volatility index. The economic significance results 
in Table 13 for the 10 indicators use outlier robust estimates to calculate our portfolio 
returns and we largely do not discover any predictability of the market indicators, 
with one exception: Only NYSE total short sales seem to provide some profitability 
after controlling for risk and transaction costs; it has both a higher Sharpe ratio and 
Jensen’s α than the buy and hold strategy. However, our main conclusion stays same. 
[Please insert Table 13 here.] 
 
6.3 Other Checks 
We also perform several additional robustness checks. First, we only test the 
economic significance of the market indicators that show significant predictability in 
both sub-samples under several alternative models, namely, OLS, GARCH (1,1), and 
robust regression models. This may be too restrictive. We loosen our criteria and 
additionally test the economic significance of those indicators that show significant 
predictability in the full-sample analysis but not in the sub-sample analysis. We 
present results for the OLS, GARCH(1,1), and robust regressions in the Appendix. 
We find no additional predictability under the OLS and the GARCH(1,1) models. 
However, we find NYSE weekly advances and NYSE net new highs have both higher 
Sharpe ratios than the market and a positive Jensen’s α under the robust regression 
model. Although these two indicators may show some practical value, this does not 
alter our main conclusion that market indicators generally show very limited 
predictability. 
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Moreover, we use an alternative dataset to define the business cycles, the CFNAI
16
 
data, which start in 1967. We classify a period as a contraction period when the 
CFNAI-MA3 is less than -0.7 and an expansion period when the CFNAI-MA3 is 
greater than -0.7. Compared with the NBER data, the CFNAI data are published in 
real time and are thus free of hindsight bias. We follow the same steps as the above 
time-varying analysis and present our results in the Appendix. The results remain 
similar and no indicator predicts the market significantly under either contractions or 
expansions. Last but not least, we check whether our results are sensitive to the 2008 
financial crisis period. We also remove the top and bottom 5% extreme observations 
from the distribution of each market indicator to control for outliers from the 
predictive variable direction. Our results remain robust; we do not present these 
results here to save space and they are available upon request. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We review the predictability of a wide range of 93 technical market indicators in 
predicting the S&P 500 returns. This adds to the literature with evidence from widely 
used but less examined market indicators, to more conclusively answer the question 
of whether technical analysis is useful or not. Overall, we do not find the market 
indicators generate profits that beat the buy and hold strategy. This result does not 
change if we consider the possibility of regime-switching predictability on business 
cycles or sentiment cycles. Moreover, our results remain robust if we use a GARCH 
(1,1) or robust regression method. With previous mixed findings on price-based 
technical indicators, it is still not easy to provide a simple positive or negative answer 
to the broad question of whether or not technical analysis is useful. Our results, at 
least, make the answer not inconclusive with evidence from the family of market 
indicators missing. 
 
  
                                                          
16
 See http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/cfnai/.  
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Table 1: Overview of Technical Market Indicators 
    
Market Indicators Sample Period Notes and Formulars More References 
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators 
1. Option Volumes:    
CBOE Calls Volume 1989 - 2011 This group of indicators uses data from closely-related option market instead of from stock market itself to predict returns. Due to 
financial institutions' larger presence in the derivatives market, these indicators are viewed as primarily a measure of institutional 
sentiment (Brown & Cliff, 2004). A call (put) option gives its holder the right, but not the obligation to buy (sell) the underlying 
security at a pre-specified price. Therefore, a rising call (put) volume indicates investors’ fear about a potential price increase 
(decrease), and reflects their bullish (bearish) sentiment. We study volumes of put/call options listed on Chicago Board of Exchange 
(CBOE) and Standard & Poor's 100 index (OEX), the volumes are published daily in their dollar values. Different from using the 
volumes directly, the ratio of traded value of puts to calls is calculated from dividing the CBOE daily dollar puts volume to the 
corresponding calls volume. It compares the relative strength of bullish/bearish sentiment. The ratio is lower (higher) during bullish 
(bearish) sentiment periods. While previous studies mainly focus on the put/call ratio only, Brown and Cliff (2004) and Wang, 
Keswani and Taylor (2006) both document that the put/call ratio does not predict stock returns.  
Dennis & Mayhew 
(2002); Feldman (2010); 
Kurov (2010); Simon & 
Wiggins (2001).   
CBOE Puts Volume 1989 - 2011 
OEX Calls Volume 1989 - 2011 
OEX Puts Volume 1989 - 2011 
CBOE Ratio of Traded Value of Puts to 
Calls* 
1986 - 2011 
  
    
2. Odd-lots Volumes:       
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases 1970 - 2011 The odd-lotters refer to small individual investors who usually trade at an amount less than the standard unit of trading. Their trading 
activities became popular contrarian indicators in the 1960s and the 1970s. When they turn bullish (bearish), odd lot purchases (sales) 
increase in contrast to actual market declines (increases). NYSE publishes its odd lot trading statistics daily since 1970. Studies 
including Lakonishok and Maberly (1990), Zweig (1973), and Gup (1973) confirm the accuracy of odd-lot trading indicators. In 
contrast, Brown and Cliff (2004) find that the odd-lot sales to purchases ratio does not predict market returns, Neal and Wheatly (1998) 
also find that the ratio does not predict the size premium while the other two sentiment proxies they use do.   
Abraham & Ikenberry 
(1994); Branch (1976); 
Brown & Cliff (2005); 
Dyl & Maberly (1992); 
Gup (1973);  Kaish 
(1969); Kewley & 
Stevenson (1967). 
NYSE Odd Lot Sales 1970 - 2011 
NYSE Odd Lot Shorts 1970 - 2011 
  
    
3. Short Sales Volumes:       
NYSE Short Sales-Members 1940 - 2008 Investors short sell to hedge against a future market decline. Technical theory insists that informed investors (for example, NYSE 
members and specialists) always build their short selling decisions on reliable savvy analysis, such that their short selling activities 
indicate future market declines. However the exact opposite holds for uninformed investors (general public), the market moves 
upwards when they short sale.  We study the weekly short sales information published by the NYSE. After 2008, The NYSE is no 
longer compiling this data on a weekly basis. Instead, they report daily data of non-specialist, specialist and total short sales. Since the 
definitions remain similar, and the weekly data before 2008 gives us a much longer sample period, we focus on data before 2008.  
Reilly and Whitford (1982) find the specialist short sales ratio (specialists' short sales/total short sales) has no merit in predicting stock 
returns from 1971 to 1979, while Fosback (1993) suggests the contrary that the ratio predicts the market during 1941 to 1975. 
However, Bowlin and Rozeff (1987) argue the above two studies can be misleading since they both use nonindependent observations, 
they correct this problem and find that the specialist short-interest ratio is inversely related to subsequent NYSE stock returns. 
Nevertheless, Brown and Cliff (2004) and Branch (1976) both study the specialists shorts and conclude they fail in predicting the stock 
returns. Branch (1976) also studies the members' short sales and finds no merit of it in predicting stock returns. Zweig (1973) on the 
other hand, finds that floor traders (NYSE members) are subject to the same overemotional pressures as individual investors so that 
they sell (buy) at bottoms (peaks) too. Lastly, the public short sales have drawn much less attention in the literature, although practical 
technical analysis textbooks like Summa (2004) and Kirkpatrick and Dahlquist (2010) view it as a contrarian indicator. 
Glushkov (2006); Lamont 
& Stein (2004). NYSE Short Sales-General Public 1940 - 2008 
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists 1940 - 2008 
NYSE Short Sales-Total 
 
 
 
 
1940 - 2008 
4. Short Interests:       
NYSE Short Interest Ratio* 
NYSE Short Interest Shares 
1931 - 2010 
1931 - 2010 
NYSE Short Interest Ratio = NYSE Short Interest Shares / Average Daily Trading Volume   
NYSE Short Interest Shares represent the monthly number of shares investors have sold short, but have not yet covered or closed out 
for securities listed on the NYSE, NYSE Arca and NYSE Amex. Short interest shares predict the market by watching whether the 
majority of investors think the market is likely to fall. When the amount of short interest shares decreases (increases) that indicates the 
uninformed investors' bullish (bearish) sentiment, the market moves downward (upward). The NYSE Short Interest Ratio is a monthly 
technical indicator calculated by dividing the NYSE Short Interest Shares over the average daily trading volume over the past 30 days. 
This ratio indicates how quick it takes to cover the short position in days. A high ratio -that is, heavy short sell of uninformed 
investors- predicts a bullish market. Seneca (1967) and Kerrigan (1974) find a significant negative relation between the short-interest 
ratio and future S&P500 returns. However, Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) suggest a positive but insignificant relationship between 
short interest ratio changes and individual stock prices. Similarly, Brown and Cliff (2004) and Vu and Caster (1987) also find results 
that do not support the predictive role of the short interest ratio. 
Biggs (1966); Gup (1973); 
Hanna (1976); Lamont & 
Stein (2004); Mayor 
(1968); Shiller (2000); 
Smith (1968). 
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5. AAII/II Sentiment Indices:      
AAII Bearish Index 1989 - 2010 Sentiment survey results provide a direct measure of investors' view on the future market. American Association of Individual 
Investors (AAII) selects a random sample of its members each week to conduct a sentiment survey, and the association gathers each 
participant’s opinion of the market movements in the next six months; up, down, or the same. The percentages of these opinions over 
the total responses form the bearish, bullish and neutral sentiment indices. One vote per member is accepted for each weekly survey. 
AAII sentiment indices predict the market contrarily, as they represent the uninformed individual investors’ views. Similar to AAII 
indices, Investors Intelligence indices represent survey results run over more than 130 investment newsletter writers asking for their 
predictions about the market; the survey answers are classified as bearish, bullish, or neutral. They are also contrarian indicators.  
Solt and Statman (1988) find no statistically significant relation between the sentiment of investment newsletter writers and subsequent 
stock returns.  Using the same set of data, Clarke and Statman (1998) confirm the results, they also find past returns and market 
volatility affect sentiment. In contrast, Lee, Jiang and Indro (2001) find the magnitude of bullish (bearish) changes in sentiment leads 
to downward (upward) revisions on volatility and higher(lower) future excess returns by using II indices as sentiment proxies. Fisher 
and Statman (2000) study both the AAII and II indices. They find investor sentiment differ across groups, AAII indices predict the 
stock returns contrarily while II indices play no predictive role. De Bondt (1993) also finds AAII indices predict future returns. 
Han (2008); Sanders, 
Irwin & Leuthold 
(1997); Wang, 
Keswani & Taylor 
(2005). 
 
AAII Bullish Index 1989 - 2010 
AAII Neutral Index 1989 - 2010 
Investors Intelligence Bearish Percentage 1987 - 2010 
Investors Intelligence Bullish Percentage 1987 - 2010 
6. Confidence Index       
Barron's Confidence Index 1932 - 2010 
                          
                                                       
                                                                
 
Barron’s-a leading American financial magazine-uses information from the bond market to calculate a sentiment index each week, and 
the index is referred to as the Barron’s Confidence Index. As one of the most historically extensive sentiment indicators, it dates back 
to 1932. Barron’s confidence index measures the discrepancy between the yields of high and low risk bonds that are largely held by 
institutional investors (Gaumnitz & Salabar, 1969). These informed investors are willing to accept a lower premium in yield for high 
risk bonds when they have more confidence with the economy, indicating a rising index value. And the exact opposite holds as well. 
Ring(1974) supports the view that the smart money will move from speculative to quality bonds during bearish market, and back 
during bullish market, and he documents that the index is a better forecaster of tops than bottoms. In contrast, Branch (1976) does not 
support Barron's Confidence Index as a stable market predictor in different sample frequencies, neither do Gaumnitz and Salabar 
(1969). 
Malek (2000); Tabell & 
Tabell (1964).  
    
7. Exchange Seat Prices:       
AMEX Seat Prices 
NYSE Annual Seat Price 
1921 – 1993 
1820 - 2003 
Exchange seat prices capture professional investors’ sentiment. It rises when market activities and stock prices rise, reflecting the 
prosperity of the brokerage industry, which provides professional services to the capital markets (Schwert, 1977). The AMEX seat 
prices are available monthly and the NYSE seat prices are available annually. They focus on long term forecasting, while most other 
sentiment indicators capture relatively short term variation. NYSE seat prices is the only annual sentiment indicator we examined, and 
it also has the longest sample period across all of our sentiment indicators-it starts in 1820 which means nearly 200 years of data. Keim 
and Madhavan (2000) document supportive evidence to the view that NYSE seat prices capture market sentiment, although Schwert 
(1977) finds no evidence that the seat returns predict market returns.  
Chiang, Gay & Kolb 
(1987); You & Holder 
(2008). 
    
  
8. Volatility Indices:       
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CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index 
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index 
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index 
AMEX NYSE Arca NASDAQ 100 Volatility 
Index 
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index 
1986 – 2011 
2001 – 2011 
1986 – 2011 
2001 – 2011 
 
2005 - 2011 
 
 
Volatility index, sometimes called the “fear index”, measures the implied volatility for a group of near-term put and call options related 
to a specific market index; that is, it represents investors’ expected risk of the market over the next 30 days. An increase (decrease) in 
the volatility index represents bearish (bullish) sentiment of the market. For example, the S&P 500 volatility index hits its historic high 
of 89.53 on October 24, 2008, reflecting investors’ serious concern during the financial crisis period. We view the volatility indices as 
primarily a measure of institutional sentiment because of institutions' large presence in the derivative markets (Brown & Cliff, 2004). 
We study 5 different volatility indices that track investors' sentiment for different stock indices. These include 4 CBOE published 
volatility indices for the S&P500, the NASDAQ, the DJIA and the S&P100, respectively, and the last volatility index is published by 
the AMEX to track the sentiment on the NASDAQ 100. Previous literature largely focuses on the S&P500 volatility index only. 
Whaley(1993) describes the construction of the S&P 500 volatility index in detail. The volatility index firstly measures the implied 
volatility using prices of only 8 S&P100 at-the-money put and call options, and later the input expanded to options based on the 
broader S&P 500 index (Investopedia).  Whaley (2000) documents the S&P100 volatility index as a reliable "investors fear" gauge, 
higher levels of the index coincide with high degrees of market turmoil. Giot (2003) also shows a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between the returns of stock and implied volatility indices on the S&P100 and NASDAQ 100 indices. However Brown 
and Cliff (2004) document results that do not support the volatility index as a reliable predictor of future stock returns.  
 
Feldman (2010); Fleming, 
Ostdiek & Whaley (1996); 
Low (2004); Simon & 
Wiggins (2001). 
9. Margin Account Balances:       
NYSE Margin Debt 
NYSE Free Credit Balances 
NYSE Free Credit Balances on Cash 
Accounts 
NYSE Free Cash Balances in Margin 
Accounts 
1918 – 2010 
1931 – 2010 
1971 – 2010 
 
1971 - 2010 
To put it simply, trading on margin means borrowing money from brokers to invest. We use market aggregate margin trading statistics 
to gauge investors' sentiment. Margin debt measures the total dollar amount of borrowing from brokers. Free credit balances represent 
the amount of money in investors’ margin accounts that are free to withdraw. Furthermore, balance in a cash account reflects the 
money left after all purchases, while balance in a margin account includes cash, as well as proceeds from short sales, along with money 
used to meet margin requirements, and excess margin and buying power (Investopedia). Investors trade on margin when they forecast a 
bullish market, therefore, the margin debt rises and the free credit balance decreases as investors fully invest all their available funds. 
In contrast, during bearish sentiment periods, the margin debt declines and the free credit balance increases, reflecting less active 
trading. We use monthly released margin account statistics that monitor the overall margin trading within the NYSE. There is 
controversy on if margin account statistics are contrarian indicators or not. Brown and Cliff (2004) view margin borrowing as a bullish 
indicator that move in the same direction as the market, and they find that the percentage changes of margin borrowing does not predict 
the market. Chen and Gu (2009) also document that margin debt borrowers' trading activities follow stock market trends rather than 
lead the market trends. In contrast, Hirose, Kato and Bremer (2008) report that information about margin buying helps predict future 
stock returns, especially for small-firm stocks at short horizons in Japanese stock market where margin trading is dominated by 
individual investors.  
Fortune (2000); Glushkov 
(2006); Kim & Ha (2010).  
10. Mutual Fund Balances:       
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Total Net 
Assets 
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash 
Percentage 
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash 
Percentage 
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds New Sales 
 
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net 
Assets 
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net 
Assets 
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net 
Assets 
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund 
Redemptions 
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund 
Redemptions 
1984 – 2010 
 
1968 – 2010 
 
1984 – 2010 
 
1984 – 2010 
 
1954 – 2010 
 
1954 – 2010 
 
1954 – 2010 
 
1954 – 2010 
 
1954 – 2010 
 
Investment fund statistics can reflect both informed and uninformed investors’ sentiment, as it connects these two groups of market 
players (the uninformed fund participants and the sophisticated fund managers).  Theoretically, individual investors invest when they 
are confident with the market growth. Hence, the money inflows (outflows) measured by new sales (redemptions) of investment funds 
represent individual investors’ bullish (bearish) sentiment. They contrarily predict the market. However, the investment fund cash 
percent and liquid assets represent the level of cash, or cash equivalents, that fund managers keep for redemptions after investments. 
Thus, a higher cash percent represents savvy investors’ bearish sentiment, indicating a market drop. We study the monthly aggregate 
statistics of mutual funds that invest in the equity market only, and then examine those for mutual funds that invest in both equity and 
bond markets. Using data from 1933 to 1993, Neal and Wheatley (1998) find evidence that fund net redemptions predict the size 
premiums.  However Brown and Cliff (2004) find that the net redemptions do not predict market returns, neither the cash percentage 
by using monthly data from 1965 to 1998. Branch (1976) also examines the cash percentages, and the author documents that some 
mutual funds reduce cash position before price increases while other do such during and after price increase. So that mutual funds 
influence stock prices but they in turn are also influenced by stock price changes. Some studies examine the predictive ability of fund 
flows between different funds, like Frazzini and Lamont (2008), Ben-Rephael, Kandel and Wohl (2012) and Hendricks, Patel and 
Zeckhauser(1993). We, instead, focus on the aggregate mutual fund trading statistics. 
Branch (1976); Edward & 
Zhang (1998); Fant 
(1999); Friesen & Sapp 
(2007); Randall, Suk & 
Tully (2003); Warther 
(1995). 
11. Market Aggregate Number of Dividend 
News: 
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Moody's Monthly Decreased Dividends 
Moody's Monthly Extra Dividends Declared 
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends 
Declared 
Moody's Monthly Omitted Dividends 
Moody's Monthly Resumed Dividends 
 
1956 – 2011 
1956 – 2011 
1956 – 2011 
 
1956 – 2011 
1956 - 2011 
 
Researchers have extensively tested the fundamental information (for example, earnings information) contained in dividend 
announcements at individual stock level (for example, Nissim & Ziv, 2001; Benartzi, Michaely & Thaler, 1997), as well as the 
sentiment information contained at this level. Baker and Wurgler (2006), for example, argue that non-dividend paying stocks are likely 
to be disproportionately sensitive to broad waves of investor sentiment. At the aggregate market level, previous studies like Denis and 
Osobov (2008) use the aggregate dollar amount of dividend to predict future returns. We, instead, look at if the aggregate number of 
dividend announcements predicts the aggregate market returns. Since dividend policies largely represent managers' forecast on future 
returns (Baker & Wurgler, 2004), we view them as institutional sentiment gauges. Positive dividend news includes increased, resumed, 
or extra, dividends, while negative dividend news means decreased, or omitted, dividends. The simple rationale states that if more 
stocks declare positive news, a bullish market is more likely and vice versa. These data are reported in S&P's and Moody's Annual 
Dividend Records, and to our best knowledge, they have not been studied in previous literature.  
Deshmukh, Goel & Howe 
(2013); Michaely, Thaler 
& Womack (1995). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                          Panel B: Market Strength Indicators 
 1.  Volume Indicators      
NYSE Total Volume 1928 - 2011 NYSE Volume Turnover = Total Volume / Average Number of Shares Outstanding 
NYSE Value Turnover = Total Volume in $USD / Total Market Capitalization 
 
Technical analysis widely uses volume information to capture market liquidity and market price movements. Baker and Stein 
(2004),  for example, note that irrational investors are more likely to trade, which will add liquidity to the market, when they are 
optimistic and betting on rising stocks rather than when they are pessimistic and betting on falling stocks. Also, Lo, Mamaysky and 
Wang (2000) document that high volume accompanying a positive price trend suggests that there may be more information content 
in the trend, e.g., broader participation among investors. Moreover, Blume, Easley and O'hara (1994) provide evidence that volume 
may provide insights regarding the quality of trader's information that cannot be obtained from price statistics. Scheinkman and 
Xiong (2003) examine the volume turnover, and find volume reveals underlying differences of opinion, which are in turn related to 
valuation levels when short selling is difficult. 
 
We study the raw NYSE total volume as well as two transformed volume turnovers. The turnovers adjust the total volume to the 
average number of shares outstanding in the same period (note that this number may not remain constant on a daily basis) to reflect 
the change on investors’ trading activities more precisely by eliminating the possibility that increased (decreased) volumes result 
from more(less) shares (in terms of volume) becoming available for trade, but not from investors’ real expectations on the market.  
Baker & Wurgler (2007); 
  
Total Volume Turnovers:  
NYSE Share Volume Turnover* 1925 - 2010 
NYSE Annual Share Value Turnover* 1934 - 2010 
    
Short-term Trading Indices:       
NYSE Short-term Trading Index* 1965-2011 Short Term Trading Index = (No. of Advancing Issues / No. of Declining Issues) /(Up Volume / Down Volume) 
 
Short-term trading index studies total volumes of uptrending and downtrending stocks in a market separately. It is sometimes 
referred to as the Arms Index or TRIN as first introduced by Richard W. Arms, Jr. in 1967.  The short-term trading index 
incorporates two sorts of information; the market breadth information and the volume information. The formula shows that a high 
short-term trading index results from current lifts in the number of advancing issues alongside drops of the up volume-the current 
market follows a weak uptrend with diverged volume movements-and this signals a future downward market. Conversely, a low 
short-term index occurs when the number of declining issues increases, with no associated downward market volume, so that the 
energy driving the downward movement is weak and a market reversal will follow.  Brown and Cliff (2004) find no merit of the 
index in predicting future stock returns; Wang, Keswani and Taylor (2005) find similar results. Whereas Simon and Wiggins (2001) 
find opposite results in the futures market where the index successfully gauges investors' bearish sentiment and predicts future 
returns.  
 
NASDAQ Short-term Trading Index* 1972-2011  
    
2. Daily Total Market Advances & 
Declines: 
      
NYSE Advances 1928 - 2011                           -            Feldman (2010) 
32 
 
NYSE Declines 1928 - 2011                                                 +             (The first value of AD Line simply takes the value of the 
same period net advances) 
                        
             
                      
 
This group of indicators uses the total advances/declines information to measure the strength of the underlying trend. They are often 
called market breadth indicators. Total advances/declines represent the number of stocks that experiences stock price 
advances/declines during a specific period. If more stocks experience price advances, a bullish market is more likely, and vice versa. 
Previous literature studies two forms of the breadth information mainly. Zakon and Pennypacker (1968) study the advance-decline 
line and they find it is worthless as a leading indicator of the stock market. Brown and Cliff (2004) study the advance/decline ratio 
and find it worthless in predicting the return either.   
We study the raw advances/declines information of three major stock exchanges, the NYSE, the NASDAQ, and the Alternext. For 
the NYSE we also study these indicators in both daily and weekly frequencies to investigate whether their forecast ability differs 
over different horizons. We also study three popular transformations of the above raw information- the net advances, the advance-
decline line, and the percentage net advances. Each of the transformed indicators has unique features. The net advances use the 
spread between advances and declines to identify the strength of the underlying trend, so that a strong trend not only causes an 
increased number of advances, but this number should also exceed the number of declines. The advance-decline line takes the 
historical advance and decline information into account. If an underlying stock market rise is fueled only by a few stocks, and the 
majority of stocks either decline, or are unchanged, the rise will not last for very long.   
The percentage net advances adjust the net advances for the total number of stocks in the market. More stocks being available for 
trade gives larger potential for the differences between advances and declines (the breadth) to expand. With the development of 
financial markets, not surprisingly we now have a lot more issues trading within any particular stock exchange. For instance, during 
the 40 years from 1960 to 2000, the NYSE Issues Traded doubled from 1,528 to 3,083. Thus, market breadth indicators may become 
more accurate when adjusted for changes in total stock issues within the market, so that the breadth information does not purely 
result from the market itself, but the investors’ real views. 
 
NYSE Net Advances* 1928 - 2011  
NYSE AD Line* 1928 - 2011  
NYSE Percentage Net Advances* 1928 - 2011  
   
NASDAQ Advances 1972 - 2011  
NASDAQ Declines 1972 - 2011  
NASDAQ Net Advances* 1972 - 2011  
NASDAQ AD Line* 1972 - 2011  
NASDAQ Percentage Net Advances* 1972 - 2011  
   
Alternext Advances 1959 - 2011   
Alternext Declines 1959 - 2011   
Alternext Net Advances* 1959 - 2011   
Alternext AD Line* 1959 - 2011   
Alternext Percentage Net Advances* 1959 - 2011   
   
Weekly Total Market Advances & 
Declines: 
  
NYSE Weekly Advances 1940 - 2010  
NYSE Weekly Declines 1940 - 2010  
NYSE Net Advances* 1940 - 2010  
NYSE AD Line* 1940 - 2010  
    
3. Daily Total Market New Highs & New 
Lows: 
      
NYSE New Highs 1928 - 2011                          -            
                                   +                        (The first value of cumulative new highs simply takes 
the value of the same period net new highs) 
                       
            
                      
 
This group of market strength indicators generally follows the same rationale to the advances/declines indicators. New highs (lows) 
measure the number of advancing (declining) stocks reaching their 52-week periodic highs (lows).  If there are more issues reaching 
their periodic highs than issues reaching their periodic lows, it means that a future uptrend is more likely, and vice versa. Again, 
similarly to the advances/declines indicators, we also include three transformed indicators to measure the market strength-the 
underlying uptrend improves when the values of the net new highs, the cumulative highs, and the percentage net new highs increase. 
Brown and Cliff (2004) find that the high/low ratio does not predict future stock returns.  
  
 
NYSE New Lows 1928 - 2011  
NYSE Net New Highs* 1932 - 2011  
NYSE Cumulative Highs* 1932 - 2011  
NYSE Percentage Net New Highs* 1932 - 2011  
   
NASDAQ New Highs 1974 - 2011  
NASDAQ New Lows 1974 - 2011  
NASDAQ Net New Highs* 1974 - 2011  
NASDAQ Cumulative Highs* 1974 - 2011  
NASDAQ Percentage Net New Highs* 1974 - 2011  
   
Alternext New Highs 1962 - 2011  
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Alternext New Lows 1962 - 2011  
Alternext Net New Highs* 1962 - 2011  
Alternext Cumulative Highs* 1962 - 2011  
Alternext Percentage Net New Highs* 1963 - 2011  
   
Weekly Total Market New Highs & New 
Lows: 
  
NYSE Weekly New Highs 1937 - 2010  
NYSE Weekly New Lows 1937 - 2010  
NYSE Net New Highs* 1937 - 2010  
NYSE Cumulative Highs* 1937 - 2010   
* Transformed Technical Market Indicators 
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Market Indicators Period β (*10ˉ³) t-stats Period 1 β (*10ˉ³) t-stats Period 2 β (*10ˉ³) t-stats
Option Volumes:
CBOE Calls Volume 1989 - 2011 -0.41 -1.17 1989-1999 -0.85 -1.55 2000-2011 -0.23 -0.55
CBOE Puts Volume 1989 - 2011 -0.01 -0.12 1989-1999 -0.02 -0.52 2000-2011 0.07 0.20
OEX Calls Volume 1989 - 2011 0.00 -1.26 1989-1999 0.00 -1.51 2000-2011 0.00 -1.29
OEX Puts Volume 1989 - 2011 0.00 0.25 1989-1999 0.00 0.16 2000-2011 0.00 0.34
CBOE Ratio of Traded Value of Puts to Calls 1986 - 2011 0.63 0.77 1986-1998 -0.07 -0.04 1999-2011 1.11 1.36
Odd-lots Volumes:
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases 1970 - 2011 0.00 -4.90 1970-1990 1.07 1.38 1991-2011 0.00 -4.05
NYSE Odd Lot Sales 1970 - 2011 0.11 0.27 1970-1990 0.78 1.25 1991-2011 -0.05 -0.10
NYSE Odd Lot Shorts 1970 - 2011 0.00 1.14 1970-1990 -0.04 -0.48 1991-2011 0.00 1.18
Short Sales Volumes:
NYSE Short Sales-Members 1940 - 2008 6.68 7.15 1940-1974 6.76 4.85 1975-2008 6.64 5.26
NYSE Short Sales-General Public 1940 - 2008 2.63 2.58 1940-1974 0.93 0.97 1975-2008 7.18 3.06
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists 1940 - 2008 5.90 5.82 1940-1974 6.99 4.93 1975-2008 5.30 3.77
NYSE Short Sales-Total 1940 - 2008 6.80 5.59 1940-1974 5.74 4.04 1975-2008 7.88 4.27
Short Interests:
NYSE Short Interest Ratio 1931 - 2010 -23.19 -2.22 1931-1970 -23.16 -2.22 1971-2010 -23.19 -2.22
NYSE Short Interest Shares 1931 - 2010 -2.93 -0.12 1931-1970 -2.92 -0.12 1971-2010 -2.93 -0.12
AAII/II Sentiment Indices:
AAII Bearish Index 1989 - 2010 0.02 0.01 1989-1999 -1.02 -0.38 2000-2010 0.77 0.31
AAII Bullish Index 1989 - 2010 6.39 2.26 1989-1999 5.17 1.55 2000-2010 7.50 1.66
AAII Neutral Index 1989 - 2010 -8.70 -2.83 1989-1999 -3.05 -0.92 2000-2010 -10.75 -2.65
Investors Intelligence Bearish Percentage 1987 - 2010 -1.04 -0.11 1987-1998 -5.17 -0.44 1999-2010 1.19 0.09
Investors Intelligence Bullish Percentage 1987 - 2010 -0.36 -0.03 1987-1998 8.19 0.74 1999-2010 -9.74 -0.50
Confidence Index:
Barron's Confidence Index 1932 - 2010 36.44 0.78 1932-1970 43.62 0.73 1971-2010 25.05 0.33
Exchange Seat Prices:
AMEX Seat Prices 1921 - 1993 3.38 0.48 1921-1958 12.74 0.82 1959-1993 -3.32 -0.76
Volatility Indices:
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index 1986 - 2011 7.01 1.74 1986-1998 3.54 0.50 1999-2011 13.10 3.04
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index 2001 - 2011 13.28 2.10 2001-2005 5.21 0.74 2006-2011 17.22 1.99
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index 1986 - 2011 7.33 1.96 1986-1998 4.09 0.60 1999-2011 12.16 3.14
AMEX NYSE Arca NASDAQ 100 Volatility Index 2001 - 2011 4.00 0.61 2001-2005 0.11 0.02 2006-2011 5.61 0.62
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index 2005 - 2011 13.39 1.90 2005-2007 11.24 2.52 2008-2011 15.75 1.13
Margin Account Balances:
NYSE Margin Debt 1918 - 2010 -0.72 -0.02 1918-1963 2.05 0.05 1964-2010 -12.29 -0.24
NYSE Free Credit Balances 1931 - 2010 80.49 2.11 1931-1970 120.88 2.07 1971-2010 48.63 0.95
NYSE Free Credit Balances on Cash Accounts 1971 - 2010 22.34 0.63 1971-1990 -5.56 -0.11 1991-2010 57.21 1.06
NYSE Free Cash Balances in Margin Accounts 1971 - 2010 1.66 0.04 1971-1990 -30.90 -1.00 1991-2010 88.08 1.12
Mutual Fund Balances:
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Total Net Assets 1984 - 2010 92.74 1.44 1984-1996 18.63 0.19 1997-2010 129.87 1.41
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash Percentage 1968 - 2010 -20.76 -0.69 1968-1988 -1.97 -0.06 1989-2010 -59.02 -0.99
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions 1984 - 2010 -4.74 -2.89 1984-1996 -5.73 -5.22 1997-2010 6.10 0.25
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds New Sales 1984 - 2010 6.59 0.54 1984-1996 5.99 0.44 1997-2010 4.21 0.17
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets 1954 - 2010 10.50 6.14 1954-1981 91.76 1.32 1982-2010 9.76 8.05
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Cash Percent 1954 - 2010 -17.87 -0.78 1954-1981 -2.94 -0.10 1982-2010 -34.84 -0.91
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Liquid Assets 1954 - 2010 13.26 0.51 1954-1981 26.58 0.86 1982-2010 -5.70 -0.13
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Redemptions 1954 - 2010 -10.50 -0.91 1954-1981 -13.13 -0.99 1982-2010 -8.53 -0.46
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund New Sales 1954 - 2010 7.89 0.85 1954-1981 7.28 0.68 1982-2010 8.73 0.53
Number of Dividend News:
Moody's Monthly Decreased Dividends 1956 - 2011 40.61 1.57 1956-1984 90.97 3.22 1985-2011 -35.03 -0.73
Moody's Monthly Extra Dividends Declared 1956 - 2011 -63.32 -1.38 1956-1984 -161.23 -1.91 1985-2011 -41.05 -0.80
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared 1956 - 2011 -97.86 -1.97 1956-1984 -125.17 -2.17 1985-2011 -57.17 -0.66
Moody's Monthly Omitted Dividends 1956 - 2011 7.60 0.24 1956-1984 35.53 0.99 1985-2011 -40.49 -0.72
Moody's Monthly Resumed Dividends 1956 - 2011 15.28 0.81 1956-1984 73.86 2.09 1985-2011 -1.88 -0.07
S&P Monthly Dividend Decreases Declared 1955 - 2010 0.43 0.45 1955-1982 1.37 1.70 1983-2010 -1.09 -0.53
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 4.48 2.17 1955-1982 5.27 2.23 1983-2010 3.60 0.99
S&P Monthly Increased Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 2.11 0.57 1955-1982 8.39 1.39 1983-2010 -0.79 -0.20
S&P Monthly Omitted Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 0.88 0.68 1955-1982 0.22 0.10 1983-2010 1.25 0.91
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 2.85 1.89 1955-1982 3.29 2.18 1983-2010 2.39 1.02
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Table 2: OLS Results
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
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Market Indicators Period β (*10ˉ³) t-stats Period 1 β (*10ˉ³) t-stats Period 2 β (*10ˉ³) t-stats
Total Volume:
NYSE Total Volume 1928 - 2011 0.09 0.83 1928-1969 0.07 0.71 1970-2011 0.65 3.48
Total Volume Turnovers:
NYSE Share Volume Turnover 1925 - 2010 5.39 0.13 1925-1967 84.20 1.72 1968-2010 -70.03 -1.27
NYSE Annual Share Value Turnover 1934 - 2010 28.23 0.64 1934-1971 40.38 0.85 1972-2010 -43.56 -0.37
Short-term Trading Indices:
NYSE Short-term Trading Index 1965-2011 -0.49 -2.15 1965-1987 -1.12 -2.94 1988-2011 0.07 0.24
NASDAQ Short-term Trading Index 1972-2011 -0.01 -1.16 1972-1991 -0.18 -1.18 1992-2011 -0.01 -1.15
Daily Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Advances 1928 - 2011 0.51 2.98 1928-1969 0.43 2.12 1970-2011 0.77 2.44
NYSE Declines 1928 - 2011 -0.72 -3.65 1928-1969 -0.53 -2.36 1970-2011 -1.18 -3.19
NYSE Net Advances 1928 - 2011 0.00 0.49 1928-1969 0.00 -0.33 1970-2011 0.00 0.99
NYSE AD Line 1928 - 2011 0.00 -0.35 1928-1969 0.00 -0.41 1970-2011 0.00 -0.12
NYSE Percentage Net Advances 1940 - 2011 0.00 0.36 1928-1969 0.00 -0.51 1970-2011 0.00 0.99
NASDAQ Advances 1972 - 2011 0.23 1.48 1972-1991 0.35 2.34 1992-2011 0.00 -0.01
NASDAQ Declines 1972 - 2011 -0.10 -3.41 1972-1991 -0.09 -4.65 1992-2011 -0.76 -1.09
NASDAQ Net Advances 1972 - 2011 0.00 -0.50 1972-1991 0.01 0.55 1992-2011 0.00 -0.97
NASDAQ AD Line 1972 - 2011 0.00 -0.22 1972-1991 0.00 -0.53 1992-2011 0.00 0.16
NASDAQ Percentage Net Advances 1972 - 2011 0.00 -0.51 1972-1991 0.01 0.55 1992-2011 0.00 -0.97
Alternext Advances 1959 - 2011 1.18 4.02 1959-1984 1.53 5.38 1985-2011 0.47 0.65
Alternext Declines 1959 - 2011 -1.04 -2.46 1959-1984 -1.06 -1.85 1985-2011 -0.98 -2.03
Alternext Net Advances 1959 - 2011 0.01 0.80 1959-1984 0.00 0.74 1985-2011 0.01 0.50
Alternext AD Line 1959 - 2011 0.00 -0.03 1959-1984 0.00 -0.14 1985-2011 0.00 0.07
Alternext Percentage Net Advances 1959 - 2011 0.01 0.60
1963-1986 0.00 -0.31 1987-2011 0.01 0.87
Weekly Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Weekly Advances 1940 - 2010 -1.49 -3.33 1940-1974 -1.14 -1.50 1975-2010 -1.69 -3.38
NYSE Weekly Declines 1940 - 2010 0.65 1.21 1940-1974 -0.28 -0.39 1975-2010 1.75 2.05
NYSE Net Advances 1940 - 2010 0.00 0.22 1940-1974 0.00 -0.17 1975-2010 0.00 0.35
NYSE AD Line 1940 - 2010 -1.20 -0.52 1940-1974 -1.16 -0.49 1975-2010 -47.20 -0.85
Daily Total Market New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE New Highs 1928 - 2011 0.14 3.61 1932-1971 0.71 4.86 1972-2011 0.10 9.80
NYSE New Lows 1932 - 2011 -0.13 -1.50 1932-1971 -0.12 -1.23 1972-2011 -0.15 -0.93
NYSE Net New Highs 1932 - 2011 0.04 1.77 1932-1971 0.05 1.44 1972-2011 0.03 1.37
NYSE Cumulative Highs 1932 - 2011 -0.01 -0.34 1932-1971 0.00 -0.09 1972-2011 -0.01 -0.30
NYSE Percentage Net New Highs 1932 - 2011 0.04 1.60 1932-1971 0.05 1.04 1972-2011 0.03 1.37
NASDAQ New Highs 1974 - 2011 -0.16 -0.43 1974-1992 0.63 1.67 1993-2011 -0.71 -1.20
NASDAQ New Lows 1974 - 2011 0.25 1.26 1974-1992 -0.24 -1.01 1993-2011 0.67 2.23
NASDAQ Net New Highs 1974 - 2011 -0.01 -0.21 1974-1992 -0.03 -0.54 1993-2011 0.01 0.21
NASDAQ Cumulative Highs 1974 - 2011 0.03 0.98 1974-1992 0.01 0.21 1993-2011 0.04 1.20
NASDAQ Percentage Net New Highs 1974 - 2011 -0.01 -0.22 1974-1992 -0.03 -0.55 1993-2011 0.01 0.19
Alternext New Highs 1962 - 2011 0.20 2.23 1962-1986 0.14 2.40 1987-2011 0.40 1.69
Alternext New Lows 1962 - 2011 -0.06 -0.89 1962-1986 -0.27 -2.31 1987-2011 0.01 0.09
Alternext Net New Highs 1962 - 2011 0.00 0.11 1962-1986 -0.05 -0.98 1987-2011 0.04 0.79
Alternext Cumulative Highs 1962 - 2011 -0.03 -0.88 1962-1986 -0.03 -0.67 1987-2011 -0.04 -0.70
Alternext Percentage Net New Highs 1962 - 2011 0.01 0.30 1963-1986 -0.03 -0.54 1987-2011 0.04 0.71
Weekly Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE Weekly New Highs 1937 - 2010 0.11 0.26 1937-1973 0.17 0.32 1974-2010 0.05 0.07
NYSE Weekly New Lows 1937 - 2010 -0.30 -0.74 1937-1973 -0.33 -0.76 1974-2010 -0.09 -0.08
NYSE Net New Highs 1937 - 2010 0.11 1.88 1937-1973 0.12 1.78 1974-2010 0.10 1.32
NYSE Cumulative Highs 1937 - 2010 -0.01 -3.62 1937-1973 0.54 2.19 1974-2010 -0.01 -3.55
This table reports the OLS results of the regression model Rt = αt + βIt-1 + εt for full samples and two equal length sub-samples . Rt represents S&P 500
periodic returns calculated as log differences of the S&P 500 Index values, It-1 represents periodic percentage changes of market indicators. We obtain all
data from the Global Financial Data. The t -statistics reported are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level.
Panel A and Panel B report results for market sentiment and market strength indicators respectively.
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
Table 2 Continued
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Market Indicators Frequency N Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
t-stats α
(*10
-3
)
t-stats β t-stats
NYSE Short Sales-Members Weekly 1743 1.28 2.27 0.84 0.93 1.70 -0.97 1.06 -0.27 -0.97 0.57 16.34
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists Weekly 1742 1.28 2.27 0.84 1.03 1.62 -0.42 0.69 -0.16 -0.57 0.51 13.69
NYSE Short Sales-Total Weekly 1742 1.28 2.27 0.84 1.13 1.69 0.18 0.38 -0.06 -0.23 0.56 15.76
NYSE Advances Daily 11024 0.24 1.06 0.85 -0.08 0.69 -3.35 5.15 -0.28 -5.51 0.40 17.23
NYSE Declines Daily 11024 0.24 1.06 0.85 -0.05 0.84 -2.36 5.13 -0.26 -5.25 0.62 20.14
Alternext Declines Daily 6608 0.30 1.18 1.57 -0.07 0.99 -1.87 4.79 -0.32 -4.45 0.69 15.48
NYSE New Highs Daily 10307 0.26 1.07 1.07 0.15 0.98 -0.02 2.52 -0.10 -2.38 0.82 62.32
Alternext New Highs Daily 6109 0.26 1.20 1.24 0.14 1.15 0.26 2.78 -0.11 -2.67 0.93 62.96
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with those of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability in
both sub-samples under the OLS regressions. We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively, then
we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in
the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical strategies at given risk level β over market returns. We also present associated t -statistics
testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t -statistics are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level.
Table 3: OLS Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
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Market Indicators β (*10ˉ³) t-stats β1 (*10ˉ³) t-stats β2 (*10ˉ³)  t-stats Chi-statistic
Option Volumes:
CBOE Calls Volume 0.00 1.15 -0.31 -0.88 -3.22 -0.90 0.65
CBOE Puts Volume -0.01 -0.12 0.01 0.18 -0.77 -0.25 0.06
OEX Calls Volume 0.00 -1.26 0.00 -1.17 -1.72 -1.31 1.73
OEX Puts Volume 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.27 1.55 1.18 1.40
CBOE Ratio of Traded Value of Puts to Calls 0.63 0.77 0.72 0.78 4.19 1.23 0.97
Odd-lots Volumes:
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases 0.00 -4.90 0.00 -5.89 -0.23 -0.16 0.20
NYSE Odd Lot Sales 0.11 0.27 0.30 0.59 -0.02 -0.02 0.06
NYSE Odd Lot Shorts 0.00 1.14 0.00 1.11 0.01 1.53 1.26
Short Sales Volumes:
NYSE Short Sales-Members 6.68 7.15 5.20 4.63 9.65 4.81 3.74
NYSE Short Sales-General Public 2.63 2.58 1.53 1.67 7.84 2.64 4.13
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists 5.90 5.82 4.92 3.46 7.41 4.67 1.36
NYSE Short Sales-Total 6.80 5.59 5.13 4.22 11.57 4.94 5.94
Short Interests:
NYSE Short Interest Ratio -23.19 -2.22 -20.54 -2.01 -45.56 -1.48 0.60
NYSE Short Interest Shares -2.93 -0.12 -3.87 -0.16 -2.32 -0.04 0.00
AAII/II Sentiment Indices:
AAII Bearish Index 0.02 0.01 1.19 0.65 -3.43 -0.45 0.35
AAII Bullish Index 6.39 2.26 2.09 0.76 19.05 2.22 3.53
AAII Neutral Index -8.70 -2.83 -5.89 -1.85 -24.61 -2.79 4.03
Investors Intelligence Bearish Percentage -1.04 -0.11 7.12 0.75 -56.87 -1.27 1.96
Investors Intelligence Bullish Percentage -0.36 -0.03 -8.97 -0.92 28.17 0.74 0.89
Confidence Index:
Barron's Confidence Index 36.44 0.78 -54.55 -1.13 182.58 1.82 4.54
Exchange Seat Prices:
AMEX Seat Prices 3.38 0.48 3.95 0.69 -0.25 -0.01 0.01
NYSE Annual Seat Price -16.55 -0.73 -31.32 -0.91 -33.93 -0.37 0.00
Volatility Indices:
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index 7.01 1.74 5.56 1.13 176.30 1.47 0.86
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index 13.28 2.10 17.01 3.21 15.40 0.53 0.10
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index 7.33 1.96 6.19 1.36 12.57 1.11 0.27
AMEX NYSE Arca NASDAQ 100 Volatility Index 4.00 0.61 10.92 2.67 -5.71 -0.38 1.11
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index 13.39 1.90 9.81 2.24 22.21 0.97 0.28
Margin Account Balances:
NYSE Margin Debt -0.72 -0.02 -17.78 -0.42 35.82 0.41 0.30
NYSE Free Credit Balances 80.49 2.11 56.75 1.62 176.92 1.45 0.90
NYSE Free Credit Balances on Cash Accounts 22.34 0.63 32.78 0.96 -64.18 -0.42 0.39
NYSE Free Cash Balances in Margin Accounts 1.66 0.04 -22.78 -0.70 69.74 0.81 1.02
Mutual Fund Balances:
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Total Net Assets 92.74 1.44 -6.10 -0.08 376.29 3.05 7.25
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash Percentage -20.76 -0.69 25.89 0.88 -288.05 -2.68 7.91
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions -4.74 -2.89 -4.53 -3.08 -2.93 -0.05 0.00
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds New Sales 6.59 0.54 1.20 0.10 56.28 1.05 1.00
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets 10.50 6.14 6.24 1.26 269.91 2.33 2.80
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Cash Percent -17.87 -0.78 10.37 0.47 -240.46 -2.57 6.80
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Liquid Assets 13.26 0.51 26.46 1.03 -72.82 -0.73 0.94
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Redemptions -10.50 -0.91 -8.75 -0.76 -15.27 -0.37 0.02
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund New Sales 7.89 0.85 3.31 0.37 27.69 0.97 0.66
Number of Dividend News:
Moody's Monthly Decreased Dividends 40.61 1.57 66.23 2.80 4.40 0.07 0.79
Moody's Monthly Extra Dividends Declared -63.32 -1.38 -30.23 -0.68 -413.47 -2.01 3.31
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared -97.86 -1.97 -93.18 -1.85 -75.62 -0.47 0.01
Moody's Monthly Omitted Dividends 7.60 0.24 39.20 1.26 -98.80 -1.14 2.23
Moody's Monthly Resumed Dividends 15.28 0.81 32.23 1.93 10.13 0.13 0.08
S&P Monthly Dividend Decreases Declared 0.43 0.45 0.60 0.62 3.34 0.60 0.23
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared 4.48 2.17 7.31 3.79 -12.79 -1.64 6.26
S&P Monthly Increased Dividends Declared 2.11 0.57 7.93 1.43 -2.87 -0.75 2.63
S&P Monthly Omitted Dividends Declared 0.88 0.68 1.21 0.89 -2.23 -0.46 0.46
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared 2.85 1.89 4.72 3.75 -3.18 -0.67 2.66
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Table 4: NBER Business Cycle Time-Varying Results
Full Sample Expansions Contractions
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Market Indicators β (*10ˉ³) t-stats β1 (*10ˉ³) t-stats β2 (*10ˉ³)  t-stats Chi-statistic
Total Volume:
NYSE Total Volume 0.09 0.83 0.05 0.67 1.59 1.84 3.14
Total Volume Turnovers:
NYSE Share Volume Turnover 5.39 0.13 34.14 1.08 16.04 0.14 0.02
NYSE Annual Share Value Turnover 28.23 0.64 35.07 0.84 18.58 0.05 0.00
Short-term Trading Indices:
NYSE Short-term Trading Index -0.49 -2.15 -0.33 -1.25 -1.39 -2.12 2.30
NASDAQ Short-term Trading Index -0.01 -1.16 0.00 0.58 -0.02 -0.93 1.02
Daily Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Advances 0.51 2.98 0.84 5.15 -0.15 -0.38 5.40
NYSE Declines -0.72 -3.65 -0.80 -4.53 -0.62 -1.31 0.12
NYSE Net Advances 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.24 0.02
NYSE AD Line 0.00 -0.35 0.00 -0.96 0.00 0.70 0.92
NYSE Percentage Net Advances 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.19 0.02
NASDAQ Advances 0.23 1.48 0.36 1.06 0.22 1.17 0.14
NASDAQ Declines -0.10 -3.41 -0.08 -5.74 -1.68 -1.45 1.90
NASDAQ Net Advances 0.00 -0.50 0.00 -0.59 0.02 1.05 1.29
NASDAQ AD Line 0.00 -0.22 0.00 0.36 -0.01 -0.76 0.70
NASDAQ Percentage Net Advances 0.00 -0.51 0.00 -0.60 0.02 1.05 1.29
Alternext Advances 1.18 4.02 1.18 3.22 1.20 2.42 0.00
Alternext Declines -1.04 -2.46 -0.80 -2.05 -2.66 -2.29 2.31
Alternext Net Advances 0.01 0.80 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.75 0.52
Alternext AD Line 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.96 0.01 0.47 0.49
Alternext Percentage Net Advances 0.01 0.60 0.00 -0.07 0.03 0.79 0.62
Weekly Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Weekly Advances -1.49 -3.33 -0.44 -0.77 -2.35 -4.08 5.61
NYSE Weekly Declines 0.65 1.21 0.71 1.31 0.79 0.55 0.00
NYSE Net Advances 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.27 -0.03 -0.19 0.04
NYSE AD Line -1.20 -0.52 -1.24 -0.53 1.54 0.02 0.00
Daily Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE New Highs 0.14 3.61 0.52 3.89 0.11 7.73 9.38
NYSE New Lows -0.13 -1.50 -0.16 -1.58 0.01 0.07 0.63
NYSE Net New Highs 0.04 1.77 0.05 2.34 -0.06 -1.24 4.76
NYSE Cumulative Highs -0.01 -0.34 0.00 0.18 -0.02 -0.50 0.28
NYSE Percentage Net New Highs 0.04 1.60 0.05 2.08 -0.06 -1.30 4.55
NASDAQ New Highs -0.16 -0.43 0.24 0.73 -0.99 -1.03 1.47
NASDAQ New Lows 0.25 1.26 0.02 0.08 1.10 1.65 2.40
NASDAQ Net New Highs -0.01 -0.21 -0.01 -0.40 -0.01 -0.11 0.02
NASDAQ Cumulative Highs 0.03 0.98 0.03 0.89 0.04 0.26 0.01
NASDAQ Percentage Net New Highs -0.01 -0.22 -0.01 -0.41 -0.01 -0.12 0.02
Alternext New Highs 0.20 2.23 0.17 2.41 0.36 0.97 0.25
Alternext New Lows -0.06 -0.89 -0.16 -0.13 0.20 0.35 0.13
Alternext Net New Highs 0.00 0.11 -0.03 -0.59 0.07 1.16 1.60
Alternext Cumulative Highs -0.03 -0.88 -0.05 -1.16 -0.10 -1.32 0.42
Alternext Percentage Net New Highs 0.01 0.30 -0.02 -0.49 0.07 1.18 1.51
Weekly Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE Weekly New Highs 0.11 0.26 0.29 0.62 -0.21 -0.23 0.23
NYSE Weekly New Lows -0.30 -0.74 -0.45 -1.02 0.07 0.09 0.29
NYSE Net New Highs 0.11 1.88 0.08 1.43 0.31 2.24 2.32
NYSE Cumulative Highs -0.01 -3.62 -0.01 -7.07 -6.04 -4.57 20.82
This table reports the OLS results of the regression model Rt = αt + β1Dt-1It-1 + β2(1-Dt-1)It-1  + εt. Rt represents S&P 500 periodic returns
calculated as log differences of the S&P 500 Index values, It-1 represents periodic percentage changes of market indicators. Dt-1 is a dummy
variable that equals 1(0) during NBER business cycle expansions(contractions). Therefore β 1 and β2 measure the predictability of a market
indicator during expansions and contractions respectively. We replicate the full sample OLS results for comparison in the first two
columns, then we report β1 and β2 with associated t -statistics, and the last column reports chi -statistics testing the null hypothesis that β1
and β2 are equal. We obtain all data from the Global Financial Data.  The t -statistics and chi -statistics reported are White standard errors
corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level. Panel A and Panel B report results for market sentiment and market
strength indicators respectively.
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
Table 4 Continued
Full Sample Expansions Contractions
39 
 
 
Market Indicators Frequency N Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
t-stats α
(*10
-3
)
t-stats β t-stats
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases Daily 5202 0.25 1.17 1.30 0.31 0.85 2.49 1.16 0.13 1.61 0.54 22.54
NYSE Short Sales-Members Weekly 1760 1.28 2.27 0.85 1.27 1.47 1.19 0.17 0.11 0.40 0.43 11.74
NYSE Short Sales-General Public Weekly 1738 1.28 2.27 0.85 1.61 1.63 3.21 1.34 0.43 1.55 0.52 13.56
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists Weekly 1758 1.28 2.27 0.85 1.49 1.45 2.74 0.95 0.33 1.23 0.42 11.44
NYSE Short Sales-Total Weekly 1756 1.28 2.27 0.85 1.46 1.50 2.45 0.83 0.30 1.09 0.45 12.11
NYSE Short Interest Ratio Monthly 458 5.29 4.51 1.34 6.55 3.48 5.34 1.27 1.17 1.10 0.60 10.96
AAII Neutral Index Weekly 563 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 0.23 1.33 -1.58 0.20 -0.06 -0.13 0.25 5.96
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index Daily 1254 0.01 1.57 -0.29 -0.01 0.35 -1.93 0.47 -0.05 -0.57 0.05 5.62
AMEX NYSE Arca NASDAQ 100 Volatility Index Daily 1253 0.01 1.57 -0.30 -0.05 0.35 -2.94 0.75 -0.09 -0.95 0.05 5.61
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index Daily 732 -0.03 1.88 -0.20 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions Monthly 144 1.29 4.87 -3.16 4.91 3.94 5.27 1.71 2.06 1.12 0.69 7.28
Moody's Monthly Decreased Dividends Monthly 310 6.16 4.57 5.76 5.24 3.56 4.81 0.25 -0.53 -0.39 0.61 9.02
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared Monthly 310 6.16 4.57 5.76 5.65 3.61 5.89 0.04 -0.16 -0.12 0.63 9.26
Moody's Monthly Resumed Dividends Monthly 310 6.16 4.57 5.76 5.66 3.46 6.16 0.10 1.11 0.81 0.52 6.73
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared Monthly 317 6.36 4.54 5.03 6.38 2.99 7.71 0.58 0.82 0.61 0.44 6.37
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared Monthly 312 7.30 4.43 7.01 7.23 3.28 9.25 0.55 0.01 0.01 0.58 8.33
NYSE Advances Daily 10975 0.24 1.06 0.86 0.00 0.67 -2.24 3.71 -0.19 -3.88 0.39 17.56
NYSE Declines Daily 10975 0.24 1.06 0.86 0.09 0.76 -0.83 2.33 -0.12 -2.28 0.51 19.56
NASDAQ Declines Daily 4955 0.25 1.18 1.33 0.30 0.87 2.44 1.08 0.13 1.50 0.55 22.04
Alternext Advances Daily 6573 0.30 1.18 1.59 -0.08 0.47 -4.15 4.13 -0.22 -4.27 0.14 8.22
Alternext Declines Daily 6573 0.30 1.18 1.59 -0.28 0.62 -6.34 6.49 -0.46 -6.90 0.27 11.51
NYSE New Highs Daily 10260 0.26 1.07 1.07 0.14 0.14 -0.83 1.39 -0.02 -2.22 0.00 5.08
NYSE Net New Highs Daily 10093 0.31 1.08 1.51 0.35 0.83 2.39 1.29 0.10 1.84 0.60 26.43
NYSE Percentage Net New Highs Daily 10091 0.26 1.08 1.01 0.30 0.82 1.86 1.24 0.09 1.64 0.59 23.05
Alternext New Highs Daily 6076 0.26 1.20 1.25 0.27 0.94 1.74 0.58 0.07 0.88 0.62 19.22
NYSE Cumulative Highs Weekly 1937 1.64 2.32 2.63 1.74 1.63 4.34 0.98 0.40 1.52 0.49 15.56
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with those of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability during NBER expansion
periods. We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively. Then we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the
Sharpe ratios of the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical
strategies at given risk level β over market returns. We also present associated t -statistics testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t-statistics are White standard errors corrected
and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level. The estimations are based on the OLS regression results.
Table 5: NBER Expansions Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
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Market Indicators Frequency N Mean
(*10
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)
Std. Dev.
(*10
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Sharpe Ratio
(*10
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)
Mean
(*10
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Std. Dev.
(*10
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Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
t-stats α
(*10
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)
t-stats β t-stats
NYSE Short Sales-Members Weekly 1780 1.26 2.26 0.76 1.18 0.82 1.10 0.13 0.07 0.39 0.14 2.98
NYSE Short Sales-General Public Weekly 1783 1.26 2.26 0.76 1.11 0.66 0.26 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.09 2.01
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists Weekly 1781 1.26 2.26 0.76 1.09 0.77 0.01 0.28 -0.02 -0.10 0.12 2.72
NYSE Short Sales-Total Weekly 1782 1.26 2.26 0.76 1.12 0.77 0.39 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.12 2.69
AAII Bullish Index Weekly 563 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 0.36 0.87 -0.86 0.32 -0.01 -0.04 0.11 2.54
AAII Neutral Index Weekly 563 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 0.56 1.22 1.02 0.79 0.25 0.57 0.21 2.44
Barron's Confidence Index Weekly 2063 1.24 2.31 0.92 0.99 0.54 -0.81 0.63 -0.06 -0.49 0.06 3.69
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Total Net Assets Monthly 321 6.46 4.54 5.22 3.39 1.47 -4.74 1.42 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 2.20
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash Percentage Monthly 321 6.46 4.54 5.22 3.32 1.96 -3.94 1.44 -0.37 -0.39 0.14 2.33
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets Monthly 147 1.75 4.89 -2.22 1.41 1.92 -7.44 0.51 0.14 0.14 0.07 1.82
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Cash Percent Monthly 241 4.92 4.36 3.44 2.92 1.59 -3.18 0.83 0.26 0.38 0.06 2.21
Moody's Monthly Extra Dividends Declared Monthly 310 6.16 4.57 5.76 2.06 1.74 -8.42 2.10 -1.12 -1.22 0.10 1.72
NYSE Total Volume Daily 10844 0.24 1.06 0.84 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.64 -0.01 -0.85 0.01 2.63
NYSE Short-term Trading Index Daily 5725 0.28 1.14 1.51 -0.02 0.47 -2.70 2.88 -0.16 -2.90 0.15 7.97
Alternext Advances Daily 6472 0.30 1.18 1.59 0.01 0.32 -3.22 3.13 -0.12 -3.40 0.06 6.07
Alternext Declines Daily 6472 0.30 1.18 1.59 -0.01 0.43 -2.94 3.16 -0.15 -3.15 0.11 7.32
NYSE Weekly Advances Weekly 1841 1.47 2.26 2.01 0.93 0.94 -0.94 1.17 -0.17 -0.83 0.17 3.98
NYSE New Highs Daily 10130 0.26 1.07 1.07 0.16 0.16 0.77 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.01 3.28
NASDAQ New Lows Daily 4534 0.24 1.21 1.26 0.02 0.50 -1.32 1.57 -0.10 -1.50 0.15 7.48
NYSE Net New Highs Weekly 1927 1.61 2.32 2.52 0.90 0.51 -2.52 1.77 -0.16 -1.22 0.05 1.48
NYSE Cumulative Highs Weekly 1937 1.64 2.32 2.63 0.88 1.23 -1.26 1.77 -0.33 -1.36 0.28 7.48
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with those of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability during NBER contraction periods.
We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively. Then we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of
the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical strategies at given risk
level β over market returns. We also present associated t -statistics testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t-statistics are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant
at 10% significance level. The estimations are based on the OLS regression results.
Table 6: NBER Contractions Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
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Market Indicators β (*10ˉ³) t-stats β1 (*10ˉ³) t-stats β2 (*10ˉ³) t-stats Chi-statistic
Option Volumes:
CBOE Calls Volume 0.00 1.15 -0.19 -0.45 -0.65 -1.10 0.40
CBOE Puts Volume -0.01 -0.12 0.01 0.38 -0.24 -0.48 0.26
OEX Calls Volume 0.00 -1.26 0.00 -1.21 -0.31 -1.40 1.95
OEX Puts Volume 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.18 0.55 0.30
CBOE Ratio of Traded Value of Puts to Calls 0.63 0.77 0.59 0.50 0.82 0.74 0.02
Odd-lots Volumes:
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases 0.00 -4.90 -0.14 -0.21 0.00 -6.68 0.04
NYSE Odd Lot Sales 0.11 0.27 0.61 1.17 -0.16 -0.24 0.87
NYSE Odd Lot Shorts 0.00 1.14 0.01 1.46 0.00 0.29 1.61
Short Sales Volumes:
NYSE Short Sales-Members 6.68 7.15 7.39 4.92 7.63 4.43 0.01
NYSE Short Sales-General Public 2.63 2.58 6.79 2.25 4.70 2.16 0.32
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists 5.90 5.82 5.93 3.63 6.51 3.64 0.06
NYSE Short Sales-Total 6.80 5.59 8.62 3.62 8.45 4.30 0.00
Short Interests:
NYSE Short Interest Ratio -23.19 -2.22 -9.58 -0.32 67.65 2.19 3.33
NYSE Short Interest Shares -2.93 -0.12 43.55 0.86 11.86 0.29 0.25
AAII/II Sentiment Indices:
AAII Bearish Index 0.02 0.01 1.82 0.68 -2.05 -0.75 1.05
AAII Bullish Index 6.39 2.26 4.98 1.32 7.87 1.92 0.27
AAII Neutral Index -8.70 -2.83 -10.55 -2.44 -6.71 -1.55 0.40
Investors Intelligence Bearish Percentage -1.04 -0.11 14.85 1.12 -18.18 -1.39 3.14
Investors Intelligence Bullish Percentage -0.36 -0.03 -7.94 -0.56 5.39 0.34 0.39
Confidence Index:
Barron's Confidence Index 36.44 0.78 -95.13 -1.20 38.75 0.46 1.33
Exchange Seat Prices:
AMEX Seat Prices 3.38 0.48 4.63 0.28 -2.62 -0.63 0.19
NYSE Annual Seat Price -16.55 -0.73 31.87 0.30 65.06 0.55 0.05
Volatility Indices:
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index 7.01 1.74 4.71 0.77 12.19 2.44 0.90
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index 13.28 2.10 3.00 0.46 18.48 1.99 1.86
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index 7.33 1.96 5.61 1.00 10.80 2.30 0.50
AMEX NYSE Arca NASDAQ 100 Volatility Index 4.00 0.61 3.22 0.61 3.96 0.44 0.00
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index 13.39 1.90 9.06 1.93 15.91 1.37 0.30
Margin Account Balances:
NYSE Margin Debt -0.72 -0.02 -55.63 -0.83 35.59 0.47 0.85
NYSE Free Credit Balances 80.49 2.11 2.42 0.04 67.13 1.08 0.60
NYSE Free Credit Balances on Cash Accounts 22.34 0.63 58.72 1.11 -7.45 -0.16 0.87
NYSE Free Cash Balances in Margin Accounts 1.66 0.04 -38.28 -1.03 50.08 0.95 1.91
Mutual Fund Balances:
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Total Net Assets 92.74 1.44 49.93 0.65 142.33 1.50 0.66
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash Percentage -20.76 -0.69 -74.82 -1.65 21.77 0.56 2.60
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions -4.74 -2.89 -5.32 -4.64 10.52 0.35 0.28
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds New Sales 6.59 0.54 2.44 0.18 16.16 0.60 0.21
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets 10.50 6.14 127.09 2.09 9.66 11.91 3.74
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Cash Percent -17.87 -0.78 -61.17 -1.42 6.46 0.20 1.59
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Liquid Assets 13.26 0.51 -7.66 -0.19 -190.00 0.63 0.34
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Redemptions -10.50 -0.91 -18.90 -0.99 -5.32 -0.28 0.25
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund New Sales 7.89 0.85 15.15 0.99 5.21 0.39 0.24
Number of Dividend News:
Moody's Monthly Decreased Dividends 40.61 1.57 40.15 0.92 28.67 0.63 0.03
Moody's Monthly Extra Dividends Declared -63.32 -1.38 -49.04 -0.81 -72.71 -0.96 0.06
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared -97.86 -1.97 -29.62 -0.32 -159.24 -1.93 1.07
Moody's Monthly Omitted Dividends 7.60 0.24 23.30 0.46 -19.25 -0.36 0.32
Moody's Monthly Resumed Dividends 15.28 0.81 39.00 2.02 -14.91 -0.46 2.05
S&P Monthly Dividend Decreases Declared 0.43 0.45 0.34 0.13 0.58 0.72 0.01
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared 4.48 2.17 5.04 1.46 3.07 0.91 0.17
S&P Monthly Increased Dividends Declared 2.11 0.57 -0.93 -0.26 7.81 1.08 1.19
S&P Monthly Omitted Dividends Declared 0.88 0.68 1.10 0.73 -0.07 -0.03 0.19
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared 2.85 1.89 7.01 3.16 0.71 0.35 4.72
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Table 7: Sentiment Cycle Time-Varying Results
Full Sample High Sentiment Low Sentiment
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Market Indicators β (*10ˉ³) t-stats β1 (*10ˉ³) t-stats β2 (*10ˉ³) t-stats Chi-statistic
Total Volume:
NYSE Total Volume 0.09 0.83 0.61 2.24 0.54 1.74 0.03
Total Volume Turnovers:
NYSE Share Volume Turnover 5.39 0.13 23.08 0.57 -113.88 -1.69 3.05
NYSE Annual Share Value Turnover 28.23 0.64 194.47 1.43 -207.02 -1.47 4.28
Short-term Trading Indices:
NYSE Short-term Trading Index -0.49 -2.15 -0.49 -1.11 -0.49 -2.01 0.00
NASDAQ Short-term Trading Index -0.01 -1.16 0.00 0.85 -0.02 -1.28 2.02
Daily Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Advances 0.51 2.98 1.18 2.39 0.66 1.88 0.74
NYSE Declines -0.72 -3.65 -1.13 -3.47 -1.31 -2.57 0.08
NYSE Net Advances 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.75 0.11
NYSE AD Line 0.00 -0.35 0.00 0.19 -0.01 -0.71 0.53
NYSE Percentage Net Advances 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.76 0.11
NASDAQ Advances 0.23 1.48 -0.13 -0.28 0.28 1.65 0.65
NASDAQ Declines -0.10 -3.41 -0.07 -11.09 -1.27 -2.46 5.35
NASDAQ Net Advances 0.00 -0.50 0.00 0.43 0.00 -0.94 0.54
NASDAQ AD Line 0.00 -0.22 0.00 0.44 0.00 -0.46 0.41
NASDAQ Percentage Net Advances 0.00 -0.51 0.00 0.41 0.00 -0.94 0.51
Alternext Advances 1.18 4.02 1.32 1.87 1.01 3.54 0.16
Alternext Declines -1.04 -2.46 -1.16 -2.06 -0.87 -1.95 0.16
Alternext Net Advances 0.01 0.80 -0.01 -0.35 0.01 1.04 0.80
Alternext AD Line 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.08 0.04
Alternext Percentage Net Advances 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.06 0.83
Weekly Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Weekly Advances -1.49 -3.33 0.47 0.47 -2.24 -5.14 6.16
NYSE Weekly Declines 0.65 1.21 1.64 1.46 0.41 0.40 0.64
NYSE Net Advances 0.00 0.22 0.01 0.75 -0.01 -0.36 0.58
NYSE AD Line -1.20 -0.52 -3.08 -0.03 -21.32 -0.38 0.03
Daily Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE New Highs 0.14 3.61 0.13 0.66 0.11 8.51 0.01
NYSE New Lows -0.13 -1.50 -0.33 -1.19 -0.18 -1.01 0.22
NYSE Net New Highs 0.04 1.77 0.03 1.25 0.00 0.10 0.40
NYSE Cumulative Highs -0.01 -0.34 -0.02 -0.50 0.00 0.13 0.24
NYSE Percentage Net New Highs 0.04 1.60 0.03 1.35 0.00 0.16 0.42
NASDAQ New Highs -0.16 -0.43 -0.17 -0.43 -0.13 -0.22 0.00
NASDAQ New Lows 0.25 1.26 0.31 0.79 0.21 0.96 0.04
NASDAQ Net New Highs -0.01 -0.21 -0.03 -0.71 0.04 0.70 0.96
NASDAQ Cumulative Highs 0.03 0.98 0.06 1.91 -0.01 -0.25 1.81
NASDAQ Percentage Net New Highs -0.01 -0.22 -0.03 -0.76 0.04 0.75 1.09
Alternext New Highs 0.20 2.23 0.60 2.39 0.29 1.82 1.07
Alternext New Lows -0.06 -0.89 -0.03 -0.14 -0.07 -0.82 0.03
Alternext Net New Highs 0.00 0.11 -0.04 -0.64 0.04 0.71 0.89
Alternext Cumulative Highs -0.03 -0.88 -0.08 -1.59 0.00 0.04 1.16
Alternext Percentage Net New Highs 0.01 0.30 -0.03 -0.58 0.04 0.81 0.95
Weekly Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE Weekly New Highs 0.11 0.26 1.42 2.26 -0.24 -0.37 3.43
NYSE Weekly New Lows -0.30 -0.74 0.78 0.52 -0.77 -0.79 0.76
NYSE Net New Highs 0.11 1.88 0.66 2.13 0.03 0.56 4.01
NYSE Cumulative Highs -0.01 -3.62 31.60 0.25 -0.01 -3.46 0.06
This table reports the OLS results of the regression model Rt = αt + β1Dt-1It-1 + β2(1-Dt-1)It-1  + εt. Rt represents S&P 500 periodic returns
calculated as log differences of the S&P 500 Index values, It-1 represents periodic percentage changes of market indicators. Dt-1 is a
dummy variable that equals 1(0) during high(low) sentiment periods measured by using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index.
Therefore β1 and β2 measure the predictability of a market indicator during expansions and contractions respectively. We replicate the full
sample OLS results for comparison in the first two columns, then we report β1 and β2 with associated t -statistics, and the last column
reports chi -statistics testing the null hypothesis that β1 and β2 are equal. We obtain all data from the Global Financial Data.  The t -
statistics and chi -statistics reported are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level. Panel
A and Panel B report results for market sentiment and market strength indicators respectively.
Low Sentiment
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
Table 7 Continued
Full Sample High Sentiment
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Market Indicators Frequency N Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
t-stats α
(*10
-3
)
t-stats β t-stats
NYSE Short Sales-Members Weekly 930 0.86 2.36 0.13 0.13 1.03 -6.84 2.23 -0.62 -2.02 0.20 5.07
NYSE Short Sales-General Public Weekly 970 0.86 2.36 0.13 0.53 1.26 -2.36 0.87 -0.25 -0.70 0.28 7.01
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists Weekly 927 0.86 2.36 0.13 0.58 1.00 -2.45 0.81 -0.21 -0.69 0.18 5.09
NYSE Short Sales-Total Weekly 938 0.86 2.36 0.13 0.24 1.13 -5.19 1.77 -0.51 -1.53 0.23 5.84
AAII Neutral Index Weekly 508 -0.14 2.70 -2.19 0.33 1.02 -1.21 0.21 0.02 0.05 0.14 3.19
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index Daily 714 -0.11 1.92 -0.66 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash Percentage Monthly 228 4.98 4.40 4.22 5.47 2.55 9.19 0.84 1.55 1.11 0.34 5.90
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions Monthly 145 2.09 4.86 -0.85 2.63 3.29 0.38 0.19 -0.36 -0.18 0.47 5.41
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets Monthly 241 4.78 4.62 3.07 3.80 2.33 1.87 0.20 -0.11 -0.08 0.26 4.04
Moody's Monthly Resumed Dividends Monthly 243 5.77 4.35 5.62 4.46 2.61 4.34 0.23 -0.05 -0.04 0.35 5.53
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared Monthly 232 6.26 4.51 6.40 4.37 3.09 3.23 0.63 -0.13 -0.08 0.46 5.14
NYSE Total Volume Daily 5585 0.27 1.14 1.44 0.19 0.70 1.25 0.16 0.04 0.49 0.37 19.24
NYSE Advances Daily 4843 0.27 1.14 1.44 -0.01 0.36 -3.21 2.99 -0.11 -2.23 0.10 11.35
NYSE Declines Daily 4987 0.27 1.14 1.44 -0.01 0.51 -2.22 2.61 -0.12 -1.88 0.19 13.10
NASDAQ Declines Daily 4910 0.24 1.18 1.27 0.25 0.75 2.06 0.65 0.09 1.15 0.41 19.02
Alternext Advances Daily 4902 0.27 1.14 1.44 -0.04 0.42 -3.50 3.30 -0.14 -2.58 0.13 11.33
Alternext Declines Daily 5056 0.27 1.14 1.44 0.01 0.53 -1.83 2.37 -0.11 -1.68 0.21 13.89
NASDAQ Cumulative Highs Daily 4541 0.23 1.21 1.20 0.26 0.78 2.14 0.75 0.11 1.21 0.42 18.75
Alternext New Highs Daily 4875 0.27 1.15 1.47 0.02 0.49 -1.74 2.21 -0.09 -1.37 0.18 14.00
NYSE Weekly New Highs Weekly 1199 1.36 2.34 2.61 0.70 1.27 -0.33 0.32 -0.17 -0.52 0.29 8.08
NYSE Net New Highs Weekly 1151 1.62 2.33 3.78 1.12 1.40 2.72 0.41 0.13 0.40 0.36 9.97
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with those of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability during high sentiment periods.
We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively. Then we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of
the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical strategies at given
risk level β over market returns. We also present associated t -statistics testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t-statistics are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if
significant at 10% significance level. The estimations are based on the OLS regression results.
Table 8: High Sentiment Periods Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
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Market Indicators Frequency N Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
t-stats α
(*10
-3
)
t-stats β t-stats
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases Daily 5175 0.24 1.17 1.26 0.01 0.89 -0.96 2.22 -0.17 -2.08 0.56 25.61
NYSE Short Sales-Members Weekly 1002 0.86 2.36 0.13 0.81 0.68 -0.31 0.13 -0.07 -0.34 0.09 3.32
NYSE Short Sales-General Public Weekly 1012 0.86 2.36 0.13 0.83 0.78 -0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.19 0.12 4.11
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists Weekly 1005 0.86 2.36 0.13 0.76 0.72 -1.00 0.33 -0.14 -0.62 0.10 3.49
NYSE Short Sales-Total Weekly 1009 0.86 2.36 0.13 0.64 0.72 -2.57 0.79 -0.23 -1.01 0.10 3.66
NYSE Short Interest Ratio Weekly 263 4.78 4.62 3.07 2.64 2.74 -2.63 0.96 -0.63 -0.46 0.29 3.84
AAII Bullish Index Weekly 538 -0.14 2.70 -2.19 0.29 1.28 -1.30 0.20 -0.08 -0.16 0.22 4.70
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index Daily 2935 0.04 1.36 -0.25 0.05 0.83 -0.26 0.00 -0.08 -0.71 0.39 14.17
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index Daily 1069 -0.01 1.58 -0.45 0.20 0.76 1.86 0.79 0.00 -0.02 0.23 4.98
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index Daily 2956 0.04 1.36 -0.25 0.14 0.84 0.77 0.66 0.00 0.01 0.39 14.23
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets Monthly 266 4.78 4.62 3.07 2.23 2.71 -4.18 1.23 -1.03 -0.75 0.30 4.06
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared Monthly 246 5.77 4.35 5.62 3.90 2.61 2.16 0.59 -0.05 -0.04 0.32 4.31
NYSE Total Volume Daily 5512 0.27 1.14 1.44 0.08 0.81 -0.27 1.66 -0.10 -1.27 0.49 22.07
NYSE Share Volume Turnover Daily 258 4.78 4.62 3.07 4.04 2.34 2.93 0.02 1.00 0.84 0.21 4.08
NYSE Short-term Trading Index Daily 4959 0.27 1.14 1.41 -0.13 0.53 -4.38 4.22 -0.27 -4.13 0.22 10.60
NYSE Advances Daily 4901 0.27 1.14 1.44 -0.11 0.37 -5.77 4.69 -0.24 -4.76 0.11 6.67
NYSE Declines Daily 4918 0.27 1.14 1.44 -0.09 0.48 -4.01 3.83 -0.23 -3.77 0.18 10.07
NASDAQ Advances Daily 4403 0.24 1.18 1.27 -0.12 0.52 -4.01 3.51 -0.23 -3.35 0.20 10.82
NASDAQ Declines Daily 4273 0.24 1.18 1.27 -0.16 0.50 -4.92 4.04 -0.28 -4.02 0.18 9.60
Alternext Advances Daily 4931 0.27 1.14 1.44 -0.06 0.41 -4.07 3.66 -0.19 -3.62 0.13 8.57
Alternext Declines Daily 5100 0.27 1.14 1.44 0.07 0.66 -0.54 1.60 -0.13 -1.72 0.32 12.71
NYSE Weekly Advances Weekly 1059 1.36 2.34 2.61 0.63 1.36 -0.86 1.32 -0.22 -0.63 0.34 6.00
NYSE New Highs Daily 5556 0.28 1.15 1.51 0.06 0.85 -0.59 2.16 -0.11 -1.47 0.54 24.73
Alternext New Highs Daily 5249 0.27 1.15 1.47 -0.01 0.72 -1.59 2.66 -0.16 -2.13 0.40 18.38
NYSE Cumulative Highs Weekly 1196 1.64 2.33 3.86 0.94 1.62 1.19 1.19 -0.27 -0.80 0.48 11.25
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with those of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability during low sentiment periods.
We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively. Then we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of
the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical strategies at given
risk level β over market returns. We also present associated t -statistics testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t-statistics are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if
significant at 10% significance level. The estimations are based on the OLS regression results.
Table 9: Low Sentiment Periods Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
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Market Indicators Period β (*10ˉ³) t value Period 1 β (*10ˉ³) t value Period 2 β (*10ˉ³) t value
Option Volumes:
CBOE Calls Volume 1989 - 2011 -0.24 -0.84 1989-1999 -0.20 -0.41 2000-2011 -0.24 -0.64
CBOE Puts Volume 1989 - 2011 0.04 0.19 1989-1999 0.01 0.04 2000-2011 0.27 0.67
OEX Calls Volume 1989 - 2011 0.00 0.08 1989-1999 0.00 -0.01 2000-2011 0.01 11.47
OEX Puts Volume 1989 - 2011 0.00 0.03 1989-1999 0.00 0.03 2000-2011 0.03 11.63
CBOE Ratio of Traded Value of Puts to Calls 1986 - 2011 0.76 1.51 1986-1998 0.81 1.07 1999-2011 0.83 1.19
Odd-lots Volumes:
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases 1970 - 2011 0.00 -0.01 1970-1990 0.70 1.06 1991-2011 0.00 -0.01
NYSE Odd Lot Sales 1970 - 2011 0.18 0.89 1970-1990 0.80 1.65 1991-2011 0.00 -0.01
NYSE Odd Lot Shorts 1970 - 2011 0.00 0.19 1970-1990 -0.04 -0.67 1991-2011 0.00 0.19
Short Sales Volumes:
NYSE Short Sales-Members 1940 - 2008 6.06 6.62 1940-1974 6.21 5.36 1975-2008 5.99 4.06
NYSE Short Sales-General Public 1940 - 2008 1.21 1.60 1940-1974 -0.14 -0.17 1975-2008 6.44 4.27
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists 1940 - 2008 6.05 6.61 1940-1974 6.47 5.66 1975-2008 5.73 3.85
NYSE Short Sales-Total 1940 - 2008 5.80 6.10 1940-1974 4.84 3.97 1975-2008 7.37 4.61
Short Interests:
NYSE Short Interest Ratio 1931 - 2010 -10.20 -1.30 1931-1970 -10.20 -1.30 1971-2010 -10.20 -1.30
NYSE Short Interest Shares 1931 - 2010 11.10 0.77 1931-1970 10.90 0.76 1971-2010 11.10 0.77
AAII/II Sentiment Indices:
AAII Bearish Index 1989 - 2010 1.04 0.59 1989-1999 0.54 0.21 2000-2010 0.77 0.31
AAII Bullish Index 1989 - 2010 0.57 0.22 1989-1999 0.98 0.29 2000-2010 0.73 0.18
AAII Neutral Index 1989 - 2010 -3.21 -1.78 1989-1999 -0.14 -0.05 2000-2010 -4.90 -2.01
Investors Intelligence Bearish Percentage 1987 - 2010 4.22 0.68 1987-1998 5.25 0.57 1999-2010 3.24 0.37
Investors Intelligence Bullish Percentage 1987 - 2010 -3.93 -0.46 1987-1998 -1.74 -0.17 1999-2010 -8.29 -0.57
Confidence Index:
Barron's Confidence Index 1932 - 2010 -40.30 -2.02 1932-1970 -45.10 -1.41 1971-2010 -25.20 -0.95
Exchange Seat Prices:
AMEX Seat Prices 1921 - 1993 0.76 0.09 1921-1958 15.10 1.15 1959-1993 -8.52 -0.97
NYSE Annual Seat Price 1820 - 2003 -7.86 -0.15 1820-1912 -12.60 -0.19 1913-2003 6.10 0.08
Volatility Indices:
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index 1986 - 2011 -0.88 -0.42 1986-1998 -5.85 -2.14 1999-2011 6.25 1.93
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index 2001 - 2011 4.65 1.15 2001-2005 1.13 0.19 2006-2011 7.89 1.37
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index 1986 - 2011 0.77 0.39 1986-1998 -4.98 -1.79 1999-2011 7.45 2.72
AMEX NYSE Arca NASDAQ 100 Volatility Index 2001 - 2011 4.16 1.17 2001-2005 0.68 0.14 2006-2011 7.88 1.49
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index 2005 - 2011 6.40 1.55 2005-2007 4.42 0.93 2008-2011 11.90 1.61
Margin Account Balances:
NYSE Margin Debt 1918 - 2010 -8.64 -0.47 1918-1963 1.60 0.07 1964-2010 -36.30 -0.85
NYSE Free Credit Balances 1931 - 2010 72.20 3.21 1931-1970 97.90 2.40 1971-2010 57.60 2.00
NYSE Free Credit Balances on Cash Accounts 1971 - 2010 31.50 1.13 1971-1990 9.48 0.22 1991-2010 63.30 1.60
NYSE Free Cash Balances in Margin Accounts 1971 - 2010 16.20 0.76 1971-1990 -12.60 -0.41 1991-2010 59.60 1.91
Mutual Fund Balances:
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Total Net Assets 1984 - 2010 35.50 0.59 1984-1996 -33.40 -0.37 1997-2010 88.40 1.06
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash Percentage 1968 - 2010 6.99 0.26 1968-1988 8.42 0.19 1989-2010 -29.10 -0.74
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions 1984 - 2010 -4.45 -0.86 1984-1996 -5.48 -0.32 1997-2010 9.00 0.44
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds New Sales 1984 - 2010 8.76 0.63 1984-1996 10.70 0.53 1997-2010 2.12 0.09
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets 1954 - 2010 10.60 0.55 1954-1981 102.60 1.69 1982-2010 9.67 0.26
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Cash Percent 1954 - 2010 11.00 0.49 1954-1981 13.90 0.45 1982-2010 9.96 0.30
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Liquid Assets 1954 - 2010 28.50 1.24 1954-1981 43.60 1.40 1982-2010 -6.90 -0.20
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Redemptions 1954 - 2010 -8.46 -1.04 1954-1981 -11.80 -1.03 1982-2010 -2.49 -0.20
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund New Sales 1954 - 2010 8.26 1.04 1954-1981 5.60 0.53 1982-2010 12.00 0.91
Number of Dividend News:
Moody's Monthly Decreased Dividends 1956 - 2008 55.70 2.32 1956-1984 79.10 2.70 1985-2011 19.30 0.47
Moody's Monthly Extra Dividends Declared 1956 - 2009 -62.90 -1.52 1956-1984 -125.60 -1.44 1985-2011 -55.40 -1.16
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared 1956 - 2009 -109.20 -2.01 1956-1984 -114.60 -1.62 1985-2011 -123.30 -1.63
Moody's Monthly Omitted Dividends 1956 - 2009 27.30 1.10 1956-1984 34.40 0.95 1985-2011 10.30 0.28
Moody's Monthly Resumed Dividends 1956 - 2009 26.00 1.41 1956-1984 83.40 2.35 1985-2011 6.24 0.31
S&P Monthly Dividend Decreases Declared 1955 - 2010 0.49 0.37 1955-1982 1.78 0.86 1983-2010 -1.18 -0.68
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 6.12 2.81 1955-1982 6.92 2.36 1983-2010 5.40 1.69
S&P Monthly Increased Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 5.59 1.62 1955-1982 12.80 2.13 1983-2010 0.24 0.04
S&P Monthly Omitted Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 0.94 0.87 1955-1982 0.55 0.34 1983-2010 0.96 0.63
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 2.59 1.80 1955-1982 4.48 1.49 1983-2010 0.85 0.49
Table 10: GARCH(1,1) Results 
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
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Market Indicators Period β (*10ˉ³) t value Period 1 β (*10ˉ³) t value Period 2 β (*10ˉ³) t value
Total Volume:
NYSE Total Volume 1928 - 2011 0.03 0.92 1928-1969 0.00 0.02 1970-2011 0.58 1.98
Total Volume Turnovers:
NYSE Share Volume Turnover 1925 - 2010 -20.90 -1.20 1925-1967 31.90 0.72 1968-2010 -60.10 -2.57
NYSE Annual Share Value Turnover 1934 - 2010 18.50 0.49 1934-1971 -7.40 -0.12 1972-2010 -16.00 -0.15
Short-term Trading Indices:
NYSE Short-term Trading Index 1965-2011 -0.66 -5.57 1965-1987 -1.21 -10.16 1988-2011 0.06 0.31
NASDAQ Short-term Trading Index 1972-2011 0.00 -0.26 1972-1991 -0.12 -1.03 1992-2011 0.00 -0.28
Daily Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Advances 1928 - 2011 1.05 15.06 1928-1969 1.15 13.84 1970-2011 0.88 6.01
NYSE Declines 1928 - 2011 -1.29 -12.92 1928-1969 -1.36 -11.76 1970-2011 -1.14 -5.80
NYSE Net Advances 1928 - 2011 0.00 -0.09 1928-1969 0.00 -0.13 1970-2011 0.00 -0.04
NYSE AD Line 1928 - 2011 0.00 -0.79 1928-1969 0.00 -1.28 1970-2011 0.00 -0.16
NYSE Percentage Net Advances 1940 - 2011 0.00 -0.19 1928-1969 0.00 -0.33 1970-2011 0.00 -0.03
NASDAQ Advances 1972 - 2011 0.42 3.05 1972-1991 0.55 4.40 1992-2011 0.12 0.56
NASDAQ Declines 1972 - 2011 -0.14 -7.59 1972-1991 -0.13 -5.96 1992-2011 -0.42 -1.17
NASDAQ Net Advances 1972 - 2011 0.00 -0.09 1972-1991 0.00 0.76 1992-2011 0.00 -0.40
NASDAQ AD Line 1972 - 2011 0.00 0.41 1972-1991 0.00 0.61 1992-2011 0.00 0.05
NASDAQ Percentage Net Advances 1972 - 2011 0.00 -0.09 1972-1991 0.00 0.76 1992-2011 0.00 -0.40
Alternext Advances 1959 - 2011 1.03 9.39 1959-1984 1.28 12.22 1985-2011 0.20 0.71
Alternext Declines 1959 - 2011 -0.76 -12.51 1959-1984 -0.77 -13.32 1985-2011 -0.64 -1.77
Alternext Net Advances 1959 - 2011 0.00 -0.36 1959-1984 0.00 0.67 1985-2011 -0.01 -1.37
Alternext AD Line 1959 - 2011 0.00 -0.78 1959-1984 0.00 -0.30 1985-2011 -0.02 -1.40
Alternext Percentage Net Advances 1959 - 2011 0.00 -0.88 1963-1986 0.00 0.21 1987-2011 -0.01 -1.17
Weekly Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Weekly Advances 1940 - 2010 -0.53 -1.19 1940-1974 0.46 0.82 1975-2010 -1.74 -2.07
NYSE Weekly Declines 1940 - 2010 0.42 0.80 1940-1974 -0.61 -0.92 1975-2010 1.94 2.42
NYSE Net Advances 1940 - 2010 0.00 0.10 1940-1974 -0.01 -0.51 1975-2010 0.00 0.20
NYSE AD Line 1940 - 2010 0.27 0.13 1940-1974 0.48 0.26 1975-2010 -97.80 -1.92
Daily Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE New Highs 1928 - 2011 0.14 8.96 1932-1971 0.46 6.50 1972-2011 0.11 1.72
NYSE New Lows 1932 - 2011 -0.30 -6.78 1932-1971 -0.34 -7.50 1972-2011 -0.15 -1.28
NYSE Net New Highs 1932 - 2011 0.01 1.00 1932-1971 0.01 0.63 1972-2011 0.01 0.63
NYSE Cumulative Highs 1932 - 2011 0.00 -0.07 1932-1971 0.01 0.35 1972-2011 0.01 0.35
NYSE Percentage Net New Highs 1932 - 2011 0.01 0.90 1932-1971 0.01 0.55 1972-2011 0.01 0.55
NASDAQ New Highs 1974 - 2011 0.41 1.85 1974-1992 0.68 2.10 1993-2011 0.15 0.49
NASDAQ New Lows 1974 - 2011 -0.10 -0.66 1974-1992 -0.26 -1.23 1993-2011 0.08 0.40
NASDAQ Net New Highs 1974 - 2011 -0.01 -0.48 1974-1992 -0.04 -1.23 1993-2011 -0.04 -1.23
NASDAQ Cumulative Highs 1974 - 2011 0.02 0.53 1974-1992 0.02 0.59 1993-2011 0.02 0.59
NASDAQ Percentage Net New Highs 1974 - 2011 -0.01 -0.50 1974-1992 -0.04 -1.24 1993-2011 -0.04 -1.24
Alternext New Highs 1962 - 2011 0.23 3.10 1962-1986 0.18 1.98 1987-2011 0.39 1.97
Alternext New Lows 1962 - 2011 -0.06 -0.66 1962-1986 -0.13 -1.19 1987-2011 0.04 0.31
Alternext Net New Highs 1962 - 2011 -0.01 -0.41 1962-1986 -0.02 -0.64 1987-2011 -0.02 -0.64
Alternext Cumulative Highs 1962 - 2011 -0.02 -0.48 1962-1986 0.03 0.79 1987-2011 0.03 0.79
Alternext Percentage Net New Highs 1962 - 2011 -0.01 -0.19 1963-1986 0.00 -0.07 1987-2011 0.00 -0.07
Weekly Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE Weekly New Highs 1937 - 2010 0.23 0.62 1937-1973 0.49 1.17 1974-2010 -0.67 -0.95
NYSE Weekly New Lows 1937 - 2010 -0.23 -1.08 1937-1973 -0.35 -1.60 1974-2010 0.24 0.35
NYSE Net New Highs 1937 - 2010 0.04 1.21 1937-1973 0.10 1.52 1974-2010 0.01 0.16
NYSE Cumulative Highs 1937 - 2010 -0.01 -0.01 1937-1973 0.56 0.18 1974-2010 -0.01 -0.01
This table reports the GARCH(1,1) results of the regression model Rt = αt + βIt-1 + εt for full samples and two equal length sub-samples . Rt represents S&P 500
periodic returns calculated as log differences of the S&P 500 Index values, It-1 represents periodic percentage changes of market indicators. We obtain all data
from the Global Financial Data. The t -statistics reported are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level. Panel
A and Panel B report results for market sentiment and market strength indicators respectively.
Table 10 Continued
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
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Market Indicators Frequency N Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
t-stats α
(*10
-3
)
t-stats β t-stats
NYSE Short Sales-Members Weekly 1740 1.28 2.27 0.84 1.41 1.84 1.69 0.58 0.20 0.77 0.66 21.94
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists Weekly 1738 1.28 2.27 0.84 1.24 1.78 0.81 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.62 19.05
NYSE Short Sales-Total Weekly 1737 1.28 2.27 0.84 1.58 1.88 2.56 1.24 0.37 1.44 0.69 24.48
NYSE Advances Daily 11024 0.24 1.06 0.85 -0.04 0.86 -2.15 4.96 -0.25 -5.06 0.64 20.41
NYSE Declines Daily 11024 0.24 1.06 0.85 -0.07 0.91 -2.43 6.36 -0.30 -6.52 0.73 38.54
NASDAQ Advances Daily 4981 0.25 1.18 1.34 0.19 1.17 0.83 2.41 -0.06 -2.41 0.98 171.38
Alternext Advances Daily 6608 0.30 1.18 1.57 0.02 1.06 -0.90 4.27 -0.25 -3.83 0.79 16.18
Alternext Declines Daily 6608 0.26 1.07 1.07 0.22 1.09 0.96 1.28 -0.05 -0.94 0.85 16.26
NYSE New Highs Daily 10307 0.30 1.18 1.57 0.27 1.06 1.18 0.73 0.01 0.81 0.97 303.42
NYSE New Lows Daily 10251 0.28 1.08 1.19 0.14 1.04 -0.07 4.58 -0.13 -4.59 0.93 116.43
Alternext New Highs Daily 6109 0.26 1.20 1.24 0.26 1.20 1.24 N/A 0.00 N/A 1.00 N/A
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with those of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability in
both sub-samples under the GARCH(1,1) regressions. We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies,
respectively. Then we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for
technical strategies in the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical strategies at given risk level β over market returns. We also present
associated t -statistics testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t-statistics are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10%
significance level.
Table 11: GARCH(1,1) Economic Significance Test 
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
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Market Indicators Period β (*10ˉ³) Chi-stats Period 1 β (*10ˉ³) Chi-stats Period 2 β (*10ˉ³) Chi-stats
Option Volumes: 0.00
CBOE Calls Volume 1989 - 2011 -0.18 0.38 1989-1999 -0.53 1.32 2000-2011 0.00 0.00
CBOE Puts Volume 1989 - 2011 0.02 0.05 1989-1999 0.00 0.00 2000-2011 0.28 0.53
OEX Calls Volume 1989 - 2011 0.00 0.06 1989-1999 0.00 0.10 2000-2011 0.00 0.00
OEX Puts Volume 1989 - 2011 0.00 0.01 1989-1999 0.00 0.01 2000-2011 0.00 0.00
CBOE Ratio of Traded Value of Puts to Calls 1986 - 2011 0.95 3.89 1986-1998 -0.06 0.01 1999-2011 1.45 3.88
Odd-lots Volumes:
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases 1970 - 2011 0.00 0.05 1970-1990 0.38 0.43 1991-2011 0.00 0.05
NYSE Odd Lot Sales 1970 - 2011 0.43 4.28 1970-1990 0.47 1.04 1991-2011 0.40 2.84
NYSE Odd Lot Shorts 1970 - 2011 0.00 0.26 1970-1990 -0.08 1.52 1991-2011 0.00 0.23
Short Sales Volumes:
NYSE Short Sales-Members 1940 - 2008 6.80 62.41 1940-1974 6.40 11.34 1975-2008 7.74 10.22
NYSE Short Sales-General Public 1940 - 2008 1.78 5.11 1940-1974 -1.02 0.38 1975-2008 5.65 5.91
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists 1940 - 2008 6.67 69.89 1940-1974 6.80 12.47 1975-2008 5.53 5.45
NYSE Short Sales-Total 1940 - 2008 6.97 51.78 1940-1974 5.22 6.70 1975-2008 8.69 11.66
Short Interests:
NYSE Short Interest Ratio 1931 - 2010 -13.53 4.05 1931-1970 -13.50 4.03 1971-2010 -13.53 4.05
NYSE Short Interest Shares 1931 - 2010 8.47 0.26 1931-1970 8.50 0.26 1971-2010 8.47 0.26
AAII/II Sentiment Indices:
AAII Bearish Index 1989 - 2010 -0.14 0.01 1989-1999 -0.41 0.02 2000-2010 0.31 0.02
AAII Bullish Index 1989 - 2010 4.91 3.69 1989-1999 4.29 1.69 2000-2010 5.69 2.06
AAII Neutral Index 1989 - 2010 -5.03 6.24 1989-1999 -2.89 0.74 2000-2010 -6.41 5.77
Investors Intelligence Bearish Percentage 1987 - 2010 3.20 0.22 1987-1998 -1.15 0.01 1999-2010 6.78 0.51
Investors Intelligence Bullish Percentage 1987 - 2010 -2.39 0.08 1987-1998 8.18 0.64 1999-2010 -19.83 2.19
Confidence Index:
Barron's Confidence Index 1932 - 2010 -35.57 3.54 1932-1970 -13.23 0.32 1971-2010 -65.22 4.36
Exchange Seat Prices:
AMEX Seat Prices 1921 - 1993 1.35 0.05 1921-1958 11.17 1.08 1959-1993 -3.42 0.22
NYSE Annual Seat Price 1820 - 2003 -24.60 0.64 1820-1912 -14.60 0.25 1913-2003 -23.90 0.14
Volatility Indices:
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index 1986 - 2011 2.93 3.70 1986-1998 -3.10 3.67 1999-2011 9.63 10.11
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index 2001 - 2011 7.81 3.96 2001-2005 2.76 0.18 2006-2011 10.97 4.73
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index 1986 - 2011 4.08 7.70 1986-1998 -2.62 2.62 1999-2011 10.21 13.44
AMEX NYSE Arca NASDAQ 100 Volatility Index 2001 - 2011 8.81 8.58 2001-2005 3.17 0.35 2006-2011 12.79 11.47
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index 2005 - 2011 9.34 7.36 2005-2007 5.22 1.89 2008-2011 17.06 6.02
Margin Account Balances:
NYSE Margin Debt 1918 - 2010 -17.64 0.82 1918-1963 -12.14 0.27 1964-2010 -14.63 0.13
NYSE Free Credit Balances 1931 - 2010 37.82 2.61 1931-1970 80.49 4.83 1971-2010 8.22 0.07
NYSE Free Credit Balances on Cash Accounts 1971 - 2010 31.88 1.18 1971-1990 -14.45 0.13 1991-2010 78.14 3.30
NYSE Free Cash Balances in Margin Accounts 1971 - 2010 -24.39 1.38 1971-1990 -30.64 1.51 1991-2010 -13.34 0.12
Mutual Fund Balances:
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Total Net Assets 1984 - 2010 28.92 0.38 1984-1996 -58.41 0.86 1997-2010 65.00 0.84
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash Percentage 1968 - 2010 -0.93 0.00 1968-1988 4.63 0.02 1989-2010 -7.91 0.03
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions 1984 - 2010 -5.38 1.85 1984-1996 -6.13 3.02 1997-2010 10.35 0.24
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds New Sales 1984 - 2010 0.80 0.00 1984-1996 -4.74 0.12 1997-2010 7.34 0.10
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets 1954 - 2010 9.40 4.35 1954-1981 90.72 2.63 1982-2010 8.66 3.55
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Cash Percent 1954 - 2010 -11.45 0.26 1954-1981 -7.15 0.06 1982-2010 -11.12 0.10
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Liquid Assets 1954 - 2010 1.80 0.01 1954-1981 18.18 0.33 1982-2010 -22.92 0.36
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Redemptions 1954 - 2010 -4.95 0.30 1954-1981 -8.58 0.46 1982-2010 -2.44 0.04
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund New Sales 1954 - 2010 3.11 0.14 1954-1981 0.82 0.01 1982-2010 6.17 0.21
Number of Dividend News:
Moody's Monthly Decreased Dividends 1956 - 2008 51.57 2.54 1956-1984 81.32 3.13 1985-2011 24.08 0.28
Moody's Monthly Extra Dividends Declared 1956 - 2009 -89.06 1.19 1956-1984 -250.92 4.08 1985-2011 0.73 0.00
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared 1956 - 2009 -108.17 2.14 1956-1984 -97.29 1.05 1985-2011 -109.76 0.90
Moody's Monthly Omitted Dividends 1956 - 2009 17.60 0.20 1956-1984 42.97 0.80 1985-2011 -35.42 0.29
Moody's Monthly Resumed Dividends 1956 - 2009 43.07 1.67 1956-1984 114.27 6.17 1985-2011 -22.79 0.23
S&P Monthly Dividend Decreases Declared 1955 - 2010 0.39 0.12 1955-1982 1.17 0.72 1983-2010 -1.26 0.45
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 4.66 4.97 1955-1982 5.52 4.07 1983-2010 3.86 1.44
S&P Monthly Increased Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 1.02 0.09 1955-1982 8.27 1.82 1983-2010 -2.02 0.24
S&P Monthly Omitted Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 1.09 0.63 1955-1982 0.37 0.03 1983-2010 1.30 0.53
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared 1955 - 2010 3.01 4.47 1955-1982 3.08 1.99 1983-2010 2.80 2.21
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Table 12: Robust Regression Results 
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
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Market Indicators Period β (*10ˉ³) Chi-stats Period 1 β (*10ˉ³) Chi-stats Period 2 β (*10ˉ³) Chi-stats
Total Volume:
NYSE Total Volume 1928 - 2011 0.02 0.12 1928-1969 -0.01 0.07 1970-2011 0.55 6.16
Total Volume Turnovers:
NYSE Share Volume Turnover 1925 - 2010 8.04 0.12 1925-1967 39.02 1.28 1968-2010 -27.24 0.79
NYSE Annual Share Value Turnover 1934 - 2010 38.72 1.14 1934-1971 36.44 0.87 1972-2010 50.18 0.27
Short-term Trading Indices:
NYSE Short-term Trading Index 1965-2011 -0.46 19.84 1965-1987 -1.02 52.78 1988-2011 0.15 0.95
NASDAQ Short-term Trading Index 1972-2011 0.00 0.00 1972-1991 -0.17 1.67 1992-2011 0.00 0.00
Daily Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Advances 1928 - 2011 0.94 237.72 1928-1969 1.10 269.05 1970-2011 0.60 22.86
NYSE Declines 1928 - 2011 -0.87 109.28 1928-1969 -0.89 91.82 1970-2011 -0.92 31.37
NYSE Net Advances 1928 - 2011 0.00 0.43 1928-1969 0.00 0.50 1970-2011 0.00 0.14
NYSE AD Line 1928 - 2011 0.00 0.01 1928-1969 0.00 0.05 1970-2011 0.00 0.04
NYSE Percentage Net Advances 1940 - 2011 0.00 0.33 1928-1969 0.00 0.29 1970-2011 0.00 0.14
NASDAQ Advances 1972 - 2011 0.21 4.72 1972-1991 0.34 8.74 1992-2011 -0.26 2.28
NASDAQ Declines 1972 - 2011 -0.08 5.71 1972-1991 -0.08 5.74 1992-2011 -0.28 0.73
NASDAQ Net Advances 1972 - 2011 0.00 0.74 1972-1991 0.00 0.15 1992-2011 0.00 0.58
NASDAQ AD Line 1972 - 2011 0.00 0.01 1972-1991 0.00 0.21 1992-2011 0.00 0.14
NASDAQ Percentage Net Advances 1972 - 2011 0.00 0.74 1972-1991 0.00 0.15 1992-2011 0.00 0.58
Alternext Advances 1959 - 2011 1.06 46.07 1959-1984 1.52 79.34 1985-2011 0.07 0.06
Alternext Declines 1959 - 2011 -1.58 102.73 1959-1984 -3.03 342.32 1985-2011 -0.77 5.49
Alternext Net Advances 1959 - 2011 0.00 0.35 1959-1984 0.00 0.31 1985-2011 0.00 0.06
Alternext AD Line 1959 - 2011 0.00 0.00 1959-1984 0.00 0.05 1985-2011 0.00 0.12
Alternext Percentage Net Advances 1959 - 2011 0.00 0.07 1963-1986 0.00 0.08 1987-2011 0.00 0.08
Weekly Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Weekly Advances 1940 - 2010 -0.99 9.93 1940-1974 0.50 1.11 1975-2010 -1.95 20.87
NYSE Weekly Declines 1940 - 2010 0.67 2.09 1940-1974 -0.34 0.34 1975-2010 1.91 6.82
NYSE Net Advances 1940 - 2010 0.00 0.07 1940-1974 -0.01 0.03 1975-2010 0.00 0.10
NYSE AD Line 1940 - 2010 -1.07 0.32 1940-1974 -0.97 0.31 1975-2010 -54.26 1.33
Daily Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE New Highs 1928 - 2011 0.11 36.67 1932-1971 0.51 49.34 1972-2011 0.10 22.02
NYSE New Lows 1932 - 2011 -0.15 9.75 1932-1971 -0.20 16.35 1972-2011 -0.14 1.61
NYSE Net New Highs 1932 - 2011 0.02 2.01 1932-1971 0.03 2.74 1972-2011 0.02 0.54
NYSE Cumulative Highs 1932 - 2011 0.00 0.00 1932-1971 0.00 0.01 1972-2011 0.00 0.01
NYSE Percentage Net New Highs 1932 - 2011 0.02 1.31 1932-1971 0.02 1.19 1972-2011 0.02 0.54
NASDAQ New Highs 1974 - 2011 0.15 0.60 1974-1992 0.43 2.27 1993-2011 -0.14 0.26
NASDAQ New Lows 1974 - 2011 0.06 0.18 1974-1992 -0.23 1.27 1993-2011 0.37 2.99
NASDAQ Net New Highs 1974 - 2011 0.01 0.05 1974-1992 0.03 0.74 1993-2011 -0.01 0.11
NASDAQ Cumulative Highs 1974 - 2011 0.02 0.35 1974-1992 0.00 0.01 1993-2011 0.03 0.58
NASDAQ Percentage Net New Highs 1974 - 2011 0.00 0.04 1974-1992 0.03 0.70 1993-2011 -0.01 0.11
Alternext New Highs 1962 - 2011 0.18 9.29 1962-1986 0.10 2.82 1987-2011 0.47 11.59
Alternext New Lows 1962 - 2011 -0.12 3.68 1962-1986 -0.25 5.85 1987-2011 -0.06 0.51
Alternext Net New Highs 1962 - 2011 -0.01 0.07 1962-1986 -0.01 0.10 1987-2011 0.01 0.02
Alternext Cumulative Highs 1962 - 2011 -0.07 5.25 1962-1986 -0.01 0.09 1987-2011 -0.12 7.37
Alternext Percentage Net New Highs 1962 - 2011 0.00 0.00 1963-1986 -0.01 0.02 1987-2011 0.01 0.04
Weekly Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE Weekly New Highs 1937 - 2010 0.01 0.00 1937-1973 0.17 0.20 1974-2010 -0.32 0.33
NYSE Weekly New Lows 1937 - 2010 -0.27 1.09 1937-1973 -0.02 0.00 1974-2010 -0.91 1.86
NYSE Net New Highs 1937 - 2010 0.08 3.74 1937-1973 0.13 3.51 1974-2010 0.06 0.96
NYSE Cumulative Highs 1937 - 2010 -0.01 0.11 1937-1973 0.50 0.41 1974-2010 -0.01 0.12
This table reports the robust regression results of the regression model Rt = αt + βIt-1 + εt for full samples and two equal length sub-samples . Rt represents S&P 500
periodic returns calculated as log differences of the S&P 500 Index values, It-1 represents periodic percentage changes of market indicators. We obtain all data from the
Global Financial Data. The t -statistics reported are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level. Panel A and Panel B
report results for market sentiment and market strength indicators respectively.
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
Table 12 Continued
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
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Market Indicators Frequency N Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
t-stats α
(*10
-3
)
t-stats β t-stats
NYSE Short Sales-Members Weekly 1791 1.06 2.29 -0.17 1.27 1.83 0.93 0.75 0.21 0.81 0.64 21.46
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists Weekly 1789 1.06 2.29 -0.17 1.25 1.78 0.82 0.64 0.18 0.69 0.61 19.12
NYSE Short Sales-Total Weekly 1788 1.06 2.29 -0.17 1.56 1.87 2.47 1.89 0.51 1.99 0.68 23.91
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index Daily 3213 0.04 1.36 -0.23 0.04 1.36 -0.22 0.22 0.00 0.23 1.00 2408.13
NYSE Short Interest Ratio Monthly 478 5.42 4.53 1.91 6.05 4.13 3.64 0.83 0.93 1.12 0.81 23.54
NYSE Advances Daily 11025 0.24 1.06 0.85 -0.07 0.84 -2.57 5.34 -0.28 -5.54 0.61 20.10
NYSE Declines Daily 11025 0.24 1.06 0.85 -0.01 0.94 -1.69 5.46 -0.24 -5.58 0.78 45.92
Alternext Declines Daily 6607 0.30 1.18 1.58 -0.19 0.95 -3.21 6.07 -0.04 -5.9 0.64 15.21
NYSE New Highs Daily 10306 0.26 1.07 1.07 0.27 1.06 1.20 0.80 0.02 0.9 0.97 280.78
Alternext New Highs Daily 6108 0.26 1.20 1.24 0.18 1.18 0.59 2.81 -0.08 -2.78 0.97 177.60
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with those of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability in
both sub-samples under the robust regressions. We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively. Then
we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in the
last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical strategies at given risk level β over market returns. We also present associated t -statistics testing
their differences from zero for α and β values. All t-statistics are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level.
Table 13: Robust Regression Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
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Market Indicators Frequency Sample Period Type N Mean (*10ˉ²) Std Dev Min Max
Option Volumes:
CBOE Calls Volume Daily 1989 - 2011 Units 5617 3.88 0.41 -0.94 9.10
CBOE Puts Volume Daily 1989 - 2011 Units 5621 6.12 1.08 -0.98 65.20
OEX Calls Volume Daily 1989 - 2011 Units 5520 526.97 267.94 -1.00 19650.20
OEX Puts Volume Daily 1989 - 2011 Units 5520 1200.18 614.78 -1.00 36312.00
CBOE Ratio of Traded Value of Puts to Calls Daily 1986 - 2011 Ratio 6429 2.10 0.23 -0.88 6.03
Odd-lots Volumes:
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases Daily 1970 - 2011 Units 10472 13.39 11.05 -1.00 1130.84
NYSE Odd Lot Sales Daily 1970 - 2011 Units 10472 3.40 0.40 -0.91 11.01
NYSE Odd Lot Shorts Daily 1970 - 2011 Units 10472 108.67 27.82 -1.00 1300.57
Short Sales Volumes:
NYSE Short Sales-Members Weekly 1940 - 2008 Units 3570 4.66 0.36 -0.89 9.75
NYSE Short Sales-General Public Weekly 1940 - 2008 Units 3570 5.68 0.40 -0.76 8.36
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists Weekly 1940 - 2008 Units 3570 4.83 0.39 -0.91 12.09
NYSE Short Sales-Total Weekly 1940 - 2008 Units 3570 4.18 0.32 -0.82 6.48
Short Interests:
NYSE Short Interest Ratio Monthly 1931 - 2010 Ratio 958 1.73 0.21 -0.73 2.70
NYSE Short Interest Shares Monthly 1931 - 2010 Units 958 1.16 0.08 -0.33 0.44
AAII/II Sentiment Indices:
AAII Bearish Index Weekly 1989 - 2010 Index Number 1133 4.78 0.35 -0.76 3.10
AAII Bullish Index Weekly 1989 - 2010 Index Number 1133 2.56 0.23 -0.67 1.70
AAII Neutral Index Weekly 1989 - 2010 Index Number 1133 3.64 0.30 -0.74 2.42
Investors Intelligence Bearish Percentage Weekly 1987 - 2010 Index Number 1227 0.34 0.08 -0.48 0.78
Investors Intelligence Bullish Percentage Weekly 1987 - 2010 Index Number 1227 0.25 0.07 -0.31 0.44
Confidence Index:
Barron's Confidence Index Weekly 1932 - 2010 Index Number 4132 0.02 0.02 -0.16 0.21
Exchange Seat Prices:
AMEX Seat Prices Monthly 1921 - 1993 National Currency 861 2.27 0.24 -0.64 4.25
NYSE Annual Seat Price Annual 1820 - 2003 National Currency 183 11.44 0.41 -0.43 3.00
Volatility Indices:
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index Daily 1986 - 2011 Index Number 6430 0.21 0.07 -0.47 3.13
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index Daily 2001 - 2011 Index Number 2560 0.09 0.05 -0.27 0.44
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index Daily 1986 - 2011 Index Number 6430 0.23 0.08 -0.47 3.13
AMEX NYSE Arca NASDAQ 100 Volatility Index Daily 2001 - 2011 Index Number 2558 0.17 0.07 -0.47 0.92
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index Daily 2005 - 2011 Index Number 1515 0.27 0.07 -0.28 0.70
Margin Account Balances:
NYSE Margin Debt Monthly 1918 - 2010 National Currency 1107 0.73 0.07 -0.34 0.95
NYSE Free Credit Balances Monthly 1931 - 2010 National Currency 950 0.89 0.06 -0.37 0.33
NYSE Free Credit Balances on Cash Accounts Monthly 1971 - 2010 National Currency 479 1.01 0.06 -0.18 0.30
NYSE Free Cash Balances in Margin Accounts Monthly 1971 - 2010 National Currency 479 1.62 0.09 -0.65 0.97
Mutual Fund Balances:
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Total Net Assets Monthly 1984 - 2010 National Currency 324 1.47 0.05 -0.23 0.19
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash Percentage Monthly 1968 - 2010 National Currency 516 0.11 0.07 -0.21 0.28
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions Monthly 1984 - 2010 National Currency 324 5.91 0.58 -0.90 9.87
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds New Sales Monthly 1984 - 2010 National Currency 324 2.95 0.19 -0.49 1.10
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets Monthly 1954 - 2010 National Currency 675 2.36 0.34 -0.90 8.81
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Cash Percent Monthly 1954 - 2010 National Currency 675 0.17 0.07 -0.22 0.30
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Liquid Assets Monthly 1954 - 2010 National Currency 671 1.24 0.06 -0.17 0.27
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Redemptions Monthly 1954 - 2010 National Currency 675 2.73 0.17 -0.52 0.63
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund New Sales Monthly 1954 - 2010 National Currency 675 2.84 0.19 -0.48 0.96
Number of Dividend News:
Moody's Monthly Decreased Dividends Monthly 1956 - 2011 Units 659 0.31 0.07 -0.24 0.32
Moody's Monthly Extra Dividends Declared Monthly 1956 - 2011 Units 659 0.15 0.04 -0.25 0.39
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared Monthly 1956 - 2011 Units 659 0.12 0.03 -0.13 0.12
Moody's Monthly Omitted Dividends Monthly 1956 - 2011 Units 659 0.76 0.06 -0.18 0.24
Moody's Monthly Resumed Dividends Monthly 1956 - 2011 Units 659 0.59 0.09 -0.38 1.27
S&P Monthly Dividend Decreases Declared Monthly 1955 - 2010 Units 669 36.00 1.40 -0.95 13.00
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared Monthly 1955 - 2010 Units 673 20.66 0.74 -0.87 3.19
S&P Monthly Increased Dividends Declared Monthly 1955 - 2010 Units 673 6.25 0.45 -0.91 7.09
S&P Monthly Omitted Dividends Declared Monthly 1955 - 2010 Units 665 26.61 1.15 -0.95 14.00
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared Monthly 1955 - 2010 Units 662 29.99 1.09 -0.90 9.00
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
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Market Indicators Frequency Sample Period Type N Mean (*10ˉ²) Std Dev Min Max
Total Volume:
NYSE Total Volume Daily 1928 - 2011 Units 22055 6.51 1.19 -0.98 163.25
Total Volume Turnovers:
NYSE Share Volume Turnover Monthly 1925 - 2010 Ratio 1032 0.15 0.06 -0.37 0.57
NYSE Annual Share Value Turnover Monthly 1934 - 2010 Ratio 915 0.30 0.04 -0.34 0.35
Short-term Trading Indices:
NYSE Short-term Trading Index Daily 1965-2011 Index Number 11667 15.44 0.74 -0.97 14.17
NASDAQ Short-term Trading Index Daily 1972-2011 Index Number 9773 162.10 22.20 -1.00 1216.00
Daily Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Advances Daily 1928 - 2011 Units 22050 15.79 0.90 -0.97 29.20
NYSE Declines Daily 1928 - 2011 Units 22050 13.01 0.66 -0.93 22.17
NYSE Net Advances Daily 1928 - 2011 Units 22022 -61.83 26.56 -893.00 1554.00
NYSE AD Line Daily 1928 - 2011 Units 22050 -0.80 1.46 -192.00 43.80
NYSE Percentage Net Advances Daily 1928 - 2011 Units 22022 -63.30 26.36 -881.20 1541.80
NASDAQ Advances Daily 1972 - 2011 Units 9962 9.84 0.90 -0.96 64.18
NASDAQ Declines Daily 1972 - 2011 Units 9962 8.77 2.48 -0.99 244.60
NASDAQ Net Advances Daily 1972 - 2011 Units 9952 -38.01 24.64 -788.00 1144.00
NASDAQ AD Line Daily 1972 - 2011 Units 9962 84.03 1.55 -38.13 114.24
NASDAQ Percentage Net Advances Daily 1972 - 2011 Units 9952 -37.84 24.67 -789.41 1147.90
Alternext Advances Daily 1959 - 2011 Units 13216 5.37 0.43 -0.94 17.80
Alternext Declines Daily 1959 - 2011 Units 13216 4.25 0.43 -0.97 30.78
Alternext Net Advances Daily 1959 - 2011 Units 13173 -52.41 11.24 -491.00 299.00
Alternext AD Line Daily 1959 - 2011 Units 13216 -0.03 0.09 -6.79 3.92
Alternext Percentage Net Advances Daily 1959 - 2011 Units 11909 -52.30 10.15 -151.72 280.57
Weekly Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Weekly Advances Weekly 1940 - 2010 Units 3688 16.75 0.97 -0.94 29.18
NYSE Weekly Declines Weekly 1940 - 2010 Units 3688 13.99 0.66 -0.92 10.87
NYSE Net Advances Weekly 1940 - 2010 Units 3683 -129.71 22.92 -671.00 482.50
NYSE AD Line Weekly 1940 - 2010 Units 3688 0.06 0.16 -6.89 4.03
Daily Total Maket New Highs & New Low:
NYSE New Highs Daily 1928 - 2011 Units 20614 19.16 3.01 -0.99 414.00
NYSE New Lows Daily 1928 - 2011 Units 20558 20.50 1.15 -0.99 58.00
NYSE Net New Highs Daily 1932 - 2011 Units 20369 3.37 4.05 -207.00 171.00
NYSE Cumulative Highs Daily 1932 - 2011 Units 20694 0.06 0.02 -0.03 2.17
NYSE Percentage Net New Highs Daily 1932 - 2011 Units 20281 2.35 3.80 -147.27 170.70
NASDAQ New Highs Daily 1974 - 2011 Units 9206 7.59 0.46 -0.92 8.50
NASDAQ New Lows Daily 1974 - 2011 Units 9203 10.11 0.61 -0.95 18.00
NASDAQ Net New Highs Daily 1974 - 2011 Units 9171 -0.60 3.76 -105.00 65.00
NASDAQ Cumulative Highs Daily 1974 - 2011 Units 9214 0.14 0.07 -1.33 6.00
NASDAQ Percentage Net New Highs Daily 1974 - 2011 Units 9167 -0.61 3.76 -104.61 65.13
Alternext New Highs Daily 1962 - 2011 Units 12219 14.83 1.19 -1.00 89.91
Alternext New Lows Daily 1962 - 2011 Units 12222 16.50 1.20 -0.99 95.00
Alternext Net New Highs Daily 1962 - 2011 Units 11929 -4.29 2.55 -82.00 92.00
Alternext Cumulative Highs Daily 1962 - 2011 Units 12462 0.16 0.24 -9.80 15.00
Alternext Percentage Net New Highs Daily 1963 - 2011 Units 11291 -2.48 2.57 -84.71 85.43
Weekly Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE Weekly New Highs Weekly 1937 - 2010 Units 3869 17.32 0.94 -0.95 17.80
NYSE Weekly New Lows Weekly 1937 - 2010 Units 3869 21.58 1.17 -0.95 27.20
NYSE Net New Highs Weekly 1937 - 2010 Units 3860 2.08 7.06 -229.00 124.50
NYSE Cumulative Highs Weekly 1937 - 2010 Units 3869 13.93 8.45 -10.72 525.00
Appendix 1 Continued
Panel B: Market Sentiment Indicators
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Market Indicators Frequency N Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
Mean
(*10
-3
)
Std. Dev.
(*10
-2
)
Sharpe Ratio
(*10
-2
)
t-stats α
(*10
-3
)
t-stats β t-stats
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases Daily 5235 0.25 1.17 1.32 0.05 1.14 -0.34 4.94 -0.19 -4.94 0.94 149.70
NYSE Short Sales-General Public Weekly 1741 1.28 2.26 0.85 1.28 1.75 1.08 0.16 0.08 0.30 0.61 17.12
AAII Bullish Index Weekly 565 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 -0.50 2.44 -3.83 0.53 -0.38 -0.93 0.84 26.23
AAII Neutral Index Weekly 565 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 0.33 2.29 -0.47 0.74 0.39 0.80 0.74 15.96
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index Daily 3213 0.04 1.36 -0.23 -0.15 1.28 -1.71 2.36 -0.19 -2.46 0.88 59.02
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index Daily 1278 0.01 1.57 -0.32 -0.55 1.12 -5.38 2.28 -0.57 -2.63 0.48 10.43
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index Daily 3213 0.04 1.36 -0.23 -0.08 1.27 -1.21 1.49 -0.13 -1.56 0.87 56.92
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index Daily 756 -0.03 1.87 -0.24 -0.31 1.31 -2.42 0.73 -0.29 -0.84 0.45 8.22
NYSE Free Credit Balances Monthly 474 5.48 4.54 2.00 4.93 3.40 1.06 0.27 0.12 0.11 0.53 9.24
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions Monthly 163 2.02 4.85 -0.98 2.02 4.85 -0.98 N/A 0.00 N/A 1 N/A
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets Monthly 336 6.53 4.53 6.00 6.50 3.54 7.59 0.41 1.40 1.03 0.58 7.46
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared Monthly 304 8.25 4.23 9.71 6.61 3.64 6.77 0.94 -0.63 -0.56 0.74 13.39
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared Monthly 335 6.24 4.52 5.43 5.89 3.67 5.75 0.09 0.79 0.60 0.63 8.16
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared Monthly 330 8.00 4.40 9.42 6.97 3.51 8.89 0.14 0.76 0.55 0.61 7.78
NYSE Short-term Trading Index Daily 5832 0.28 1.14 1.50 -0.38 0.95 -5.09 8.34 -0.60 -8.55 0.68 31.14
NASDAQ Declines Daily 4980 0.25 1.18 1.32 0.27 1.17 1.57 1.36 0.03 1.34 0.98 74.32
Alternext Advances Daily 6607 0.30 1.18 1.58 -0.33 0.86 -5.12 7.14 -0.54 -7.24 0.52 14.20
NYSE Weekly Advances Weekly 1843 1.47 2.26 2.01 1.21 1.97 0.98 0.70 -0.15 -0.63 0.75 32.10
NYSE Net New Highs Daily 10139 0.25 1.08 1.00 0.18 1.00 0.33 1.78 -0.06 -1.67 0.86 78.72
NYSE Net New Highs Weekly 1929 1.61 2.32 2.52 1.56 1.86 2.86 0.24 0.16 0.62 0.64 21.87
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with those of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability in full sample under the OLS
regressions. We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively. Then we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the
Sharpe ratios of the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical
strategies at given risk level β over market returns. We also present associated t -statistics testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t -statistics are White standard errors corrected and
marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level.
Appendix 2: Additional OLS Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
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AAII Neutral Index Weekly 565 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 0.09 2.55 -1.35 0.89 0.26 0.86 0.92 38.75
Barron's Confidence Index Weekly 2065 1.24 2.31 0.92 1.47 2.12 2.06 1.27 0.26 1.41 0.84 42.79
Moody's Monthly Decreased Dividends Monthly 326 6.24 4.45 4.50 4.70 3.83 1.23 1.07 -0.91 -0.80 0.73 14.28
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared Monthly 304 8.25 4.23 9.71 6.77 3.69 7.11 0.87 -0.54 -0.50 0.76 14.17
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared Monthly 330 8.00 4.40 9.42 7.37 3.56 9.87 0.12 1.09 0.79 0.63 7.90
NYSE Short-term Trading Index Daily 5832 0.28 1.14 1.50 -0.38 0.95 -5.09 8.34 -0.60 -8.55 0.68 31.14
NASDAQ Advances Daily 4980 0.25 1.18 1.32 0.13 1.16 0.35 3.64 -0.11 -3.73 0.97 141.00
NASDAQ Declines Daily 4980 0.25 1.18 1.32 0.27 1.17 1.57 1.36 0.03 1.34 0.98 74.32
Alternext Advances Daily 6607 0.30 1.18 1.58 -0.33 0.86 -5.12 7.14 -0.54 -7.24 0.52 14.20
NYSE New Lows Daily 10278 0.27 1.08 1.12 0.15 1.02 0.02 3.15 -0.11 -3.11 0.88 95.00
NASDAQ New Highs Daily 6708 0.16 0.01 2.05 0.08 0.92 -0.83 4.94 -0.25 -4.81 0.79 35.13
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with tose of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability in full sample under the
GARCH(1,1) regressions. We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively. Then we report t -statistics testing the null
hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns
generated by the technical strategies at given risk level β over market returns. We also present associated t -statistics testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t -statistics are White
standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level.
Appendix 3: Additional GARCH（1,1) Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
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CBOE Ratio of Traded Value of Puts to Calls Daily 3213 0.04 1.36 -0.23 0.03 1.36 -0.33 1.45 -0.01 -1.49 1.00 1282.28
NYSE Odd Lot Sales Daily 5235 0.25 1.17 1.32 0.15 1.15 0.48 2.95 -0.09 -2.93 0.96 153.56
NYSE Short Sales-General Public Weekly 1720 1.28 2.23 0.85 1.45 2.09 1.71 0.92 0.20 1.03 0.85 51.83
AAII Bullish Index Weekly 565 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 -0.27 2.61 -2.72 0.33 -0.09 -0.39 0.96 61.89
AAII Neutral Index Weekly 565 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 0.28 2.51 -0.63 1.27 0.43 1.24 0.89 33.57
Barron's Confidence Index Weekly 2065 1.24 2.31 0.92 1.44 2.17 1.87 1.25 0.22 1.37 0.88 48.95
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index Daily 1278 0.01 1.57 -0.32 -0.28 1.30 -2.56 1.30 -0.30 -1.43 0.67 18.34
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index Daily 3213 0.04 1.36 -0.23 0.07 1.36 -0.05 1.61 0.02 1.65 1.00 491.27
AMEX NYSE Arca NASDAQ 100 Volatility Index Daily 1277 0.00 1.57 -0.33 -0.42 1.26 -3.78 1.88 -0.44 -2.10 0.63 15.89
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index Daily 756 -0.03 1.87 -0.24 -0.40 1.68 -2.47 1.27 -0.39 -1.38 0.79 17.09
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets Monthly 336 6.53 4.53 6.00 7.04 3.86 8.35 0.75 1.53 1.16 0.71 8.18
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared Monthly 336 6.43 4.53 5.84 5.66 3.91 4.77 0.35 0.08 0.07 0.73 9.00
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared Monthly 330 8.00 4.40 9.42 7.46 4.00 9.00 0.17 0.31 0.31 0.81 20.55
NASDAQ Advances Daily 4980 0.25 1.18 1.32 0.21 1.17 0.98 2.54 -0.04 -2.64 0.99 249.78
NASDAQ Declines Daily 4980 0.25 1.18 1.32 0.24 1.18 1.30 1.22 0.00 -1.26 1.00 7474.20
Alternext Advances Daily 6607 0.30 1.18 1.58 -0.23 0.93 -3.72 6.41 -0.47 -6.30 0.61 14.95
NYSE Weekly Advances Weekly 1843 1.02 2.26 2.01 1.78 2.16 3.54 2.16 0.35 2.31 0.91 64.17
NYSE New Lows Daily 10278 0.27 1.08 1.12 0.17 1.06 0.25 3.84 -0.09 -3.90 0.95 151.99
Alternext New Lows Daily 6110 0.25 1.20 1.17 0.08 1.13 -0.22 3.00 -0.15 -2.64 0.88 16.08
Alternext Cumulative Highs Daily 5842 0.21 1.21 0.87 0.17 1.20 0.58 1.81 -0.03 -1.78 0.99 255.18
NYSE Net New Highs Weekly 1929 1.61 2.32 2.52 1.98 2.19 4.35 2.42 0.43 2.57 0.89 48.94
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with tose of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability in full sample under the GARCH(1,1)
regressions. We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively. Then we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the Sharpe
ratios of the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical strategies at
given risk level β over market returns. We also present associated t -statistics testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t -statistics are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if
significant at 10% significance level.
Appendix 4: Additional Robust Regression Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
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Market Indicators β (*10ˉ³) t value β1 (*10ˉ³) t value β2 (*10ˉ³) t value Chi-statistic
Option Volumes:
CBOE Calls Volume 0.00 1.15 -0.32 -0.97 -2.29 -0.82 0.49
CBOE Puts Volume -0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.04 -0.74 -0.31 0.10
OEX Calls Volume 0.00 -1.26 0.00 -1.26 -1.12 -1.04 1.07
OEX Puts Volume 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 1.52 1.17 1.38
CBOE Ratio of Traded Value of Puts to Calls 0.63 0.77 0.74 0.90 -0.21 -0.06 0.07
Odd-lots Volumes:
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases 0.00 -4.90 0.00 -6.24 -0.33 -0.25 0.06
NYSE Odd Lot Sales 0.11 0.27 0.32 1.16 -0.41 -0.37 0.40
NYSE Odd Lot Shorts 0.00 1.14 0.00 0.14 0.01 1.58 2.02
Short Sales Volumes:
NYSE Short Sales-Members 6.68 7.15 5.93 3.64 9.94 4.28 2.00
NYSE Short Sales-General Public 2.63 2.58 3.74 1.99 14.00 3.91 6.42
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists 5.90 5.82 5.21 2.52 7.22 4.79 0.61
NYSE Short Sales-Total 6.80 5.59 6.53 3.59 13.48 4.66 4.13
Short Interests:
NYSE Short Interest Ratio -23.19 -2.22 25.54 1.09 37.20 0.63 0.03
NYSE Short Interest Shares -2.93 -0.12 6.02 0.17 51.82 0.69 0.31
AAII/II Sentiment Indices:
AAII Bearish Index 0.02 0.01 0.57 0.31 3.47 -0.48 0.30
AAII Bullish Index 6.39 2.26 3.33 1.21 16.69 2.10 2.10
AAII Neutral Index -8.70 -2.83 -6.85 -2.22 -18.89 -1.85 1.28
Investors Intelligence Bearish Percentage -1.04 -0.11 4.46 0.48 -30.19 -0.87 0.93
Investors Intelligence Bullish Percentage -0.36 -0.03 -4.30 -0.44 11.94 0.35 0.21
Confidence Index:
Barron's Confidence Index 36.44 0.78 -63.15 -1.45 100.32 0.74 1.33
Exchange Seat Prices:
AMEX Seat Prices 3.38 0.48 -2.91 -0.74 14.42 0.29 0.12
NYSE Annual Seat Price -16.55 -0.73 78.17 0.81 -339.21 -1.11 1.58
Volatility Indices:
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index 7.01 1.74 5.68 1.24 19.06 1.58 1.07
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index 13.28 2.10 14.90 2.93 8.68 0.44 0.09
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index 7.33 1.96 6.57 1.59 13.78 1.21 0.35
AMEX NYSE Arca NASDAQ 100 Volatility Index 4.00 0.61 10.68 2.76 -7.06 -0.45 1.22
CBOE DJIA Volatility Index 13.39 1.90 10.25 2.32 21.82 0.95 0.24
Margin Account Balances:
NYSE Margin Debt -0.72 -0.02 -32.88 -0.59 44.67 0.36 0.33
NYSE Free Credit Balances 80.49 2.11 3.60 0.09 149.82 1.05 0.98
NYSE Free Credit Balances on Cash Accounts 22.34 0.63 32.52 0.95 -41.55 -0.29 0.26
NYSE Free Cash Balances in Margin Accounts 1.66 0.04 -24.67 -0.83 133.67 1.28 2.16
Mutual Fund Balances:
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Total Net Assets 92.74 1.44 -3.10 -0.04 311.35 2.73 5.91
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash Percentage -20.76 -0.69 16.95 0.56 -260.10 -2.56 6.82
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions -4.74 -2.89 -5.35 -4.17 29.78 0.56 0.44
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds New Sales 6.59 0.54 -3.24 -0.27 67.98 1.70 2.92
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets 10.50 6.14 9.75 10.51 203.01 1.52 2.10
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Cash Percent -17.87 -0.78 13.29 0.51 -206.80 -2.01 4.30
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Liquid Assets 13.26 0.51 32.62 1.11 -76.53 -0.69 0.93
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Redemptions -10.50 -0.91 -15.98 -1.22 3.72 0.07 0.14
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund New Sales 7.89 0.85 3.23 0.31 26.85 0.75 0.40
Number of Dividend News:
Moody's Monthly Decreased Dividends 40.61 1.57 27.19 0.85 42.06 0.49 0.03
Moody's Monthly Extra Dividends Declared -63.32 -1.38 12.32 0.28 -517.81 -3.05 9.05
Moody's Monthly Increased Dividends Declared -97.86 -1.97 -74.67 -1.19 -190.32 -1.19 0.44
Moody's Monthly Omitted Dividends 7.60 0.24 -4.29 -0.11 2.62 0.02 0.00
Moody's Monthly Resumed Dividends 15.28 0.81 17.33 0.84 -18.23 -0.24 0.21
S&P Monthly Dividend Decreases Declared 0.43 0.45 -0.16 -0.11 9.41 0.98 0.97
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared 4.48 2.17 5.36 2.08 -5.88 -0.65 1.45
S&P Monthly Increased Dividends Declared 2.11 0.57 4.01 0.60 0.60 0.14 0.19
S&P Monthly Omitted Dividends Declared 0.88 0.68 0.87 0.60 -6.08 -1.04 1.33
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared 2.85 1.89 3.50 2.59 -1.91 -0.38 1.09
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Appendix 5: CFNAI Business Cycle Time-Varying Results
Full Sample Expansions Contractions
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Market Indicators β (*10ˉ³) t value β1 (*10ˉ³) t value β2 (*10ˉ³) t value Chi-statistic
Total Volume:
NYSE Total Volume 0.09 0.83 0.51 3.02 3.73 1.85 2.52
Total Volume Turnovers:
NYSE Share Volume Turnover 5.39 0.13 -72.86 -2.18 -65.27 -0.51 0.00
NYSE Annual Share Value Turnover 28.23 0.64 -11.06 -0.11 -59.14 -0.18 0.02
Short-term Trading Indices:
NYSE Short-term Trading Index -0.49 -2.15 -0.36 -1.49 -1.09 -1.59 1.00
NASDAQ Short-term Trading Index -0.01 -1.16 0.00 -0.65 -0.02 -0.93 0.46
Daily Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Advances 0.51 2.98 0.84 2.82 0.71 0.99 0.03
NYSE Declines -0.72 -3.65 -0.91 -3.89 -1.99 -1.83 0.95
NYSE Net Advances 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.31 0.02 2.10 3.89
NYSE AD Line 0.00 -0.35 0.00 -0.61 0.01 0.65 0.58
NYSE Percentage Net Advances 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.32 0.02 2.10 3.88
NASDAQ Advances 0.23 1.48 0.22 1.93 0.32 0.45 0.02
NASDAQ Declines -0.10 -3.41 -0.08 -5.22 -1.80 -1.53 2.14
NASDAQ Net Advances 0.00 -0.50 0.00 -1.12 0.02 1.31 2.27
NASDAQ AD Line 0.00 -0.22 0.00 0.41 -0.01 -0.94 1.03
NASDAQ Percentage Net Advances 0.00 -0.51 0.00 -1.13 0.02 1.31 2.26
Alternext Advances 1.18 4.02 0.90 2.79 2.16 1.92 1.16
Alternext Declines -1.04 -2.46 -1.27 -4.65 -2.97 -2.06 1.35
Alternext Net Advances 0.01 0.80 0.00 0.28 0.02 0.64 0.29
Alternext AD Line 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -1.21 0.04 2.27 6.58
Alternext Percentage Net Advances 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.67 0.38
Weekly Total Market Advances & Declines:
NYSE Weekly Advances -1.49 -3.33 -1.13 -1.62 -2.41 -4.07 2.02
NYSE Weekly Declines 0.65 1.21 0.53 0.64 1.79 0.92 0.35
NYSE Net Advances 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.11 0.01
NYSE AD Line -1.20 -0.52 25.61 0.56 -156.05 -1.23 1.83
Daily Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE New Highs 0.14 3.61 0.10 19.92 0.60 1.03 0.74
NYSE New Lows -0.13 -1.50 -0.22 -1.44 -0.06 -0.09 0.07
NYSE Net New Highs 0.04 1.77 0.02 1.00 0.01 0.16 0.01
NYSE Cumulative Highs -0.01 -0.34 -0.01 -0.61 0.07 0.78 0.80
NYSE Percentage Net New Highs 0.04 1.60 0.02 1.00 0.01 0.15 0.01
NASDAQ New Highs -0.16 -0.43 -0.02 -0.07 -0.42 -0.46 0.17
NASDAQ New Lows 0.25 1.26 0.11 0.57 0.76 1.44 1.31
NASDAQ Net New Highs -0.01 -0.21 -0.01 -0.30 0.02 0.25 0.13
NASDAQ Cumulative Highs 0.03 0.98 0.02 0.69 0.16 1.18 1.01
NASDAQ Percentage Net New Highs -0.01 -0.22 -0.01 -0.32 0.02 0.24 0.12
Alternext New Highs 0.20 2.23 0.24 2.52 1.08 1.60 1.51
Alternext New Lows -0.06 -0.89 -0.04 -0.49 -0.13 -0.23 0.02
Alternext Net New Highs 0.00 0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.15 1.29 1.47
Alternext Cumulative Highs -0.03 -0.88 -0.02 -0.41 -0.12 -1.68 1.52
Alternext Percentage Net New Highs 0.01 0.30 0.00 0.05 0.15 1.28 1.39
Weekly Total Maket New Highs & New Lows:
NYSE Weekly New Highs 0.11 0.26 0.17 0.27 1.86 1.67 1.77
NYSE Weekly New Lows -0.30 -0.74 -0.45 -0.71 0.51 0.12 0.05
NYSE Net New Highs 0.11 1.88 0.10 1.26 0.36 0.63 0.21
NYSE Cumulative Highs -0.01 -3.62 -0.01 -11.59 -7.00 -10.81 116.35
This table reports the OLS results of the regression model Rt = αt + β1Dt-1It-1 + β2(1-Dt-1)It-1  + εt. Rt represents S&P 500 periodic returns
calculated as log differences of the S&P 500 Index values, It-1 represents periodic percentage changes of market indicators. Dt-1 is a
dummy variable that equals 1(0) during CFNAI business cycle expansions(contractions). Therefore β 1 and β2 measure the predictability
of a market indicator during expansions and contractions respectively. We replicate the full sample OLS results for comparison in the first
two columns, then we report β1 and β2 with associated t -statistics, and the last column reports chi -statistics testing the null hypothesis
that β1 and β2 are equal. We obtain all data from the Global Financial Data.  The t -statistics and chi -statistics reported are White
standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level. Panel A and Panel B report results for market
sentiment and market strength indicators respectively.
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
Appendix 5: CFNAI Business Cycle Time-Varying Results
Full Sample Expansions Contractions
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t-stats β t-stats
NYSE Odd Lot Purchases Daily 5218 0.25 1.17 1.32 0.09 0.86 -0.10 1.40 -0.08 -1.00 0.54 22.68
NYSE Short Sales-Members* Weekly 1054 0.87 2.27 0.26 0.99 0.73 2.46 0.64 0.15 0.67 0.12 4.03
NYSE Short Sales-General Public Weekly 1055 0.87 2.27 0.26 0.93 0.75 1.59 0.39 0.08 0.35 0.13 4.21
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists* Weekly 1050 0.87 2.27 0.26 0.63 0.81 -2.29 0.76 -0.23 -0.97 0.15 4.18
NYSE Short Sales-Total Weekly 1050 0.87 2.27 0.26 0.96 0.72 2.00 0.50 0.11 0.52 0.12 3.83
AAII Neutral Index Weekly 525 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 0.14 0.81 -3.58 0.24 -0.28 -0.84 0.11 2.27
CBOE NASDAQ Volatility Index Daily 1274 0.01 1.57 -0.32 -0.18 0.61 -3.85 1.13 -0.18 -1.14 0.15 7.82
AMEX NYSE Acra NASDAQ 100 Volatility Index Daily 1273 0.00 1.57 -0.33 -0.09 0.62 -2.27 0.63 -0.08 -0.53 0.16 7.90
CBOE DJIA Average Volatility Index Daily 752 -0.03 1.87 -0.24 0.00 0.67 -0.12 0.03 0.07 0.30 0.13 6.22
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Redemptions Monthly 153 2.09 4.84 -0.79 4.79 3.95 5.85 1.33 1.32 0.69 0.67 7.20
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Net Assets Monthly 207 5.56 4.39 5.45 4.60 2.40 5.98 0.09 0.74 0.52 0.28 5.08
S&P Monthly Extra Dividends Declared* Monthly 200 5.54 4.38 5.44 3.80 1.95 3.32 0.31 0.37 0.32 0.17 4.08
S&P Monthly Resumed Dividends Declared* Monthly 246 7.90 4.46 9.65 3.25 1.95 -1.73 1.77 -0.88 -0.79 0.16 3.47
NYSE Total Volume Daily 5468 0.26 1.16 1.37 0.01 0.60 -1.55 2.15 -0.14 -2.06 0.25 10.56
NYSE Share Volume Turnover Daily 240 5.56 4.39 5.45 4.14 2.92 3.34 0.40 -0.45 -0.30 0.44 6.22
NYSE Advances Daily 5539 0.26 1.16 1.38 -0.25 0.65 -5.41 5.31 -0.39 -5.33 0.31 17.06
NYSE Declines Daily 5466 0.26 1.16 1.38 0.03 0.56 -1.25 1.88 -0.11 -1.77 0.22 10.43
NASDAQ Advances Daily 4971 0.25 1.18 1.32 0.04 0.84 -0.64 1.83 -0.12 -1.45 0.52 21.41
NASDAQ Declines Daily 4971 0.25 1.18 1.32 0.30 0.90 2.31 1.02 0.13 1.56 0.59 22.78
Alternext Advances Daily 5468 0.26 1.16 1.37 -0.05 0.53 -2.82 2.91 -0.19 -3.05 0.19 9.34
Alternext Declines Daily 5468 0.26 1.16 1.37 0.01 0.58 -1.61 2.17 -0.14 -2.10 0.24 10.34
NYSE New Highs Daily 5502 0.25 1.16 1.33 0.13 0.82 0.32 0.98 -0.04 -0.49 0.51 22.40
Alternext New Highs Daily 5453 0.25 1.16 1.30 -0.04 0.76 -1.84 2.77 -0.19 -2.45 0.43 20.64
NYSE Cumulative Highs Weekly 1138 1.54 2.34 3.58 0.62 1.43 -0.59 1.60 -0.40 -1.15 0.37 7.47
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with tose of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability in full sample under the GARCH(1,1)
regressions. We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively. Then we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of
the two strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical strategies at given risk level β
over market returns. We also present associated t -statistics testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t-statistics are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10%
significance level. The estimations are based on the OLS regression results.
Appendix 6: CFNAI Expansions Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
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NYSE Short Sales-Members Weekly 1054 0.87 2.27 0.26 0.99 0.73 2.46 0.64 0.15 0.67 0.12 4.03
NYSE Short Sales-General Public Weekly 1055 0.87 2.27 0.26 0.93 0.75 1.59 0.39 0.08 0.35 0.13 4.21
NYSE Short Sales-Specialists Weekly 1050 0.87 2.27 0.26 0.63 0.81 -2.29 0.76 -0.23 -0.97 0.15 4.18
NYSE Short Sales-Total Weekly 1050 0.87 2.27 0.26 0.96 0.72 2.00 0.50 0.11 0.52 0.12 3.83
AAII Bullish Index Weekly 524 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 0.57 0.69 1.92 0.86 0.14 0.49 0.07 1.93
AAII Neutral Index Weekly 525 -0.21 2.66 -2.43 0.14 0.81 -3.58 0.24 -0.28 -0.84 0.11 2.27
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Total Net Assets Monthly 141 2.09 4.84 -0.79 0.61 1.79 -10.46 0.98 -1.44 -1.26 0.09 2.15
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds Cash Percentage Monthly 241 5.15 4.39 4.65 3.13 2.37 0.08 0.71 -0.32 -0.24 0.25 3.33
USA Mutual Fund Equity Funds New Sales Monthly 141 2.09 4.84 -0.79 0.59 1.50 -12.64 1.11 -0.92 -1.36 0.03 1.14
USA Mutual Fund Equity and Bond Fund Cash Percent Monthly 243 5.56 4.39 5.45 2.22 2.36 -4.01 1.44 -0.82 -0.62 0.23 3.07
Moody's Monthly Extra Dividends Declared Monthly 252 5.67 4.37 5.67 2.98 1.48 -1.41 0.94 0.14 0.20 0.07 2.54
NYSE Total Volume Daily 5468 0.26 1.16 1.37 0.01 0.60 -1.55 2.15 -0.14 -2.06 0.25 10.56
NYSE Declines Daily 5466 0.26 1.16 1.38 0.03 0.56 -1.25 1.88 -0.11 -1.77 0.22 10.43
NYSE Net Advances Daily 10287 0.31 1.08 1.48 0.16 0.58 0.20 1.34 -0.04 -0.86 0.28 13.77
NYSE Percentage Net Advances Daily 10286 0.31 1.08 1.47 0.16 0.58 0.15 1.38 -0.04 -0.91 0.28 13.80
Alternext Advances Daily 5468 0.26 1.16 1.37 -0.05 0.53 -2.82 2.91 -0.19 -3.05 0.19 9.34
Alternext Declines Daily 5468 0.26 1.16 1.37 0.01 0.58 -1.61 2.17 -0.14 -2.10 0.24 10.34
Alternext AD Line Daily 5447 0.30 1.16 1.70 0.07 0.72 -0.41 1.75 -0.11 -1.50 0.37 14.72
NYSE Weekly Advances Weekly 1119 1.26 2.35 2.37 0.57 1.22 -1.04 1.20 -0.28 -0.88 0.28 4.66
Alternext Cumulative Highs Daily 4957 0.34 1.17 2.11 0.02 0.74 -0.95 2.45 -0.17 -2.15 0.38 14.35
NYSE Weekly New Highs Weekly 1126 1.26 2.35 2.37 0.23 1.19 -3.92 2.16 -0.62 -1.92 0.26 4.48
NYSE Cumulative Highs Weekly 1138 1.54 2.34 3.58 0.62 1.43 -0.59 1.60 -0.40 -1.15 0.37 7.47
This table compares risk and return characteristics of buy and hold strategies with tose of market-indicator-based technical strategies that show significant predictability in full sample under the GARCH(1,1) regressions.
We report means, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for buy and hold strategies and technical strategies, respectively. Then we report t -statistics testing the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of the two
strategies are equal. We then report Jensen's α estimation results for technical strategies in the last four columns. α values indicate excess returns generated by the technical strategies at given risk level β over market
returns. We also present associated t -statistics testing their differences from zero for α and β values. All t-statistics are White standard errors corrected and marked in bold if significant at 10% significance level. The
estimations are based on the OLS regression results.
Appendix 7: CFNAI Contractions Economic Significance Test 
Buy & Hold Strategy Technical Strategy
Panel A: Market Sentiment Indicators
Panel B: Market Strength Indicators
